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A powerful legal, social, and religious construct grounded in the 
disapproval of sexual intercourse outside of marriage, illegitimacy2 of birth 
                                                          
 1. See Charlotte Rotman, Gestation pour autrui: les enfants fantômes de la 
République, LA LIBÉRATION, May 20, 2009, http://www.liberation.fr/societe/ 
0101568271-gestation-pour-autrui-les-enfants-fantomes-de-la-republique. 
* Professor of Law, City University of New York.  J.D., Columbia, 1993; M.A., 
Columbia, 1989; B.A., Miami University, 1987.  I wish to thank Jessica Levy for her 
excellent research assistance and CUNY School of Law for its generous research 
support. 
 2. I am sensitive to the fact that this archaic and harsh term has been the source of 
much injustice and psychic harm.  I use it in this Article to emphasize how damaging it 
is to attach any legal disability to families or children created without marriage.  Thus, I 
do not use the term in the “morally neutral” way a sociologist might, see, e.g., 
LEWELLYN HENDRIX, ILLEGITIMACY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURES: CROSS-CULTURAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON NONMARITAL BIRTH 2 (1996), but recognize that any term used to 
describe children born out of wedlock as a class will inevitably have “moral 
overtones,” especially when used in the context of establishing or justifying differential 
1
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has been a source of abiding concern and fascination throughout history.  
Essentially a badge separating insiders from outsiders, illegitimacy as a 
category has been promoted by the church, nation states, and society at 
large to encourage marriage as the only appropriate locus for family 
formation.3  Parents of nonmarital children have been branded licentious 
reprobates, their children vilified as interlopers, subhuman, unworthy of 
civil status, and even loathed by their own parents.4  The harshest means of 
exclusion have been the imposition of disabilities in the establishment of 
legal parentage,5 naming,6 and support and inheritance rights,7 and the 
institutionalization of infant abandonment,8 and even banishment.9  These 
disabilities have had a disproportionate impact on women and the poor10 
and are understood today to have been the tools of a patriarchal order 
                                                          
treatment of children.  Id.  In addition, I agree that it is best to employ historically 
accurate terminology in an effort to confront the very real stigma that has always 
attached, in some cases despite our best intentions, to the use of terms like “bastard,” 
“illegitimate child,” “born out of wedlock,” and “nonmarital.”  See E. WAYNE CARP, 
FAMILY MATTERS: SECRECY AND DISCLOSURE IN THE HISTORY OF ADOPTION xiii 
(1998). 
 3. See CARP, supra note 2, at 4; Kathleen Kiernan, European Perspectives on 
Nonmarital Childbearing, in OUT OF WEDLOCK: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF 
NONMARITAL FERTILITY 77, 105-06 (Lawrence L. Wu & Barbara Wolfe eds., 2001); 
THE CHILD: AN ENCYCLOPEDIC COMPANION 237 (Richard A. Shweder ed., 2009) 
(commenting on the work of sociologist Kingsley Davis); JOHN WITTE, JR., THE SINS 
OF THE FATHERS: THE LAW AND THEOLOGY OF ILLEGITIMACY RECONSIDERED 4 (2009). 
 4. See Richard F. Storrow, Equal Protection for Human Clones, 40 FAM. L.Q. 
529, 542 (2006) [hereinafter Storrow, Equal Protection]. 
 5. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 646 (1972) (“Under Illinois law, the 
children of unwed fathers become wards of the State upon the death of the mother.”).  
Now that highly accurate and inexpensive means of genetic testing are easily available, 
the establishment of paternity has become an area fraught with difficult questions.  See 
Ira Ellman, Thinking about Custody and Support in Ambiguous-Father Families, 36 
FAM. L.Q. 49, 55 (2002); Jana Singer, Marriage, Biology, and Paternity: The Case for 
Revitalizing the Marital Presumption, 65 MD. L. REV. 246, 252-53 (2006).  As a 
constitutional matter, where a marital presumption of paternity applies, the law does 
not require that parentage between a child and his biological father be recognized.  See 
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 129 (1989). 
 6. See THE CHILD, supra note 3, at 711 (emphasizing the lack of rights of 
illegitmate children including the right to their father’s last name). 
 7. See id.; Richard F. Storrow, The Policy of Family Privacy: Uncovering the Bias 
in Favor of Nuclear Families in American Constitutional Law and Policy Reform, 66 
MO. L. REV. 527, 600-01 (2001) [hereinafter Storrow, Family Privacy] (discussing 
how several states have passed legislation denying fathers inheritance rights unless they 
acknowledged their children). 
 8. See generally JOHN BOSWELL, THE KINDNESS OF STRANGERS: THE 
ABANDONMENT OF CHILDREN IN WESTERN EUROPE FROM LATE ANTIQUITY TO THE 
RENAISSANCE 2 (1988); DAVID KERTZER, SACRIFICED FOR HONOR: ITALIAN INFANT 
ABANDONMENT AND THE POLITICS OF REPRODUCTIVE CONTROL 4 (1993). 
 9. JOEL FRANCIS HARRINGTON, THE UNWANTED CHILD: THE FATE OF 
FOUNDLINGS, ORPHANS, AND JUVENILE CRIMINALS 44 (2009); JOHN WITTE, GOD’S 
JOUST, GOD’S JUSTICE: LAW AND RELIGION IN THE WESTERN TRADITION 420 (2006). 
 10. See THE CHILD, supra note 3, at 591. 
2
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol20/iss3/8
  
2012] PHANTOM CHILDREN OF THE REPUBLIC 563 
variously committed to extolling marital nuclear families,11 genetic 
essentialism,12 and ethnic and religious purity.13 
Whatever deterrent effect the legal disabilities of illegitimacy may once 
have had appears to have slackened considerably, as the social stigma 
attached to premarital sexuality, cohabitation and the birth of children out-
of-wedlock has waned.14  Demographic data on fertility in the United States 
indicates a steady increase of births to unmarried women since the 1960s.  
As of 2005, out-of-wedlock births comprised 37% of all births.15  Of these, 
40% are born to cohabiting parents.16  Today, the majority of children born 
to American women under the age of 30 are nonmarital.17  In parts of 
Europe the percentage of couples who are not officially married is as high 
as 25% (Norway) and is expected to increase “along with the tendency for 
nonmarital unions to become more prone to the birth of children . . . .”18  
Although some see these as disturbing trends, today it may simply “be 
reductionist to view child and family welfare merely as a function of 
marriage or illegitimacy.”19  
As a result of the work of committed advocates, children born to single 
women and to unmarried heterosexual couples labor under far fewer 
constraints than they did when nonmarital fertility was considered a more 
                                                          
 11. See Storrow, Equal Protection, supra note 4, at 541-42; Storrow, Family 
Privacy, supra note 7, at 530, 620; Richard F. Storrow, Rescuing Children from the 
Marriage Movement: The Case Against Marital Status Discrimination in Adoption and 
Assisted Reproduction, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 305, 348 (2006) [hereinafter Storrow, 
Rescuing Children] (addressing how the American marriage movement views 
heterosexual marriage as central to social integrity and aims to deter any forces that 
threaten its primacy). 
 12. See THE CHILD, supra note 3, at 24 (describing the church’s reverence for the 
consanguineous nuclear family). 
 13. See R. Charli Carpenter, Surfacing Children: Limitations of Genocidal Rape 
Discourse, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 428, 492-30 (2000) (describing how forced impregnation 
and the birth of children of mixed ethnicity was aimed at “corroding the victimized 
culture” in the former Yugoslavia). 
 14. See THE CHILD, supra note 3, at 341; STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE 
NEVER WERE: AMERICAN FAMILIES AND THE NOSTALGIA TRAP 186 (1992). 
 15. See THE CHILD, supra note 3, at 245.  Stephanie Coontz found that the rate of 
out-of-wedlock births was similar in the Puritan community of Concord, Massachusetts 
before the Revolutionary War.  See COONTZ, supra note 14, at 184. 
 16. THE CHILD, supra note 3, at 591. 
            17. Jason DeParle & Sabrina Tavernise, For Women under 30, Most Births Occur 
Outside Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2012, at A1. 
 18. THE CHILD, supra note 3, at 590. 
 19. Wolfgang Hirczy de Mino, From Bastardy to Equality: The Rights of 
Nonmarital Children and their Fathers in Comparative Perspective, 31 J. COMP. FAM. 
STUD. 231, 233 (2000); see also Richard F. Storrow, Marginalizing Adoption Through 
the Regulation of Assisted Reproduction, 35 CAP. U. L. REV. 479, 507-10 (2006) 
[hereinafter Storrow, Marginalizing Adoption] (criticizing a proposal to bestow a 
preferred status on married couples in the adoption process); Storrow, Rescuing 
Children, supra note 11, at 320-23, 342-44, 367-69 (criticizing presumptions of 
parental fitness and child welfare that are based on marital status). 
3
Storrow: The Phantom Children of the Republic: International Surrogacy and
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2012
  
564 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 20:3 
serious threat to social stability than it is today.  Although the reforms of 
the latter half of the twentieth century were among the most sweeping in 
dismantling legal distinctions based on legitimacy of birth,20 the injustice of 
disadvantaging children born out of wedlock was recognized long before 
rates of out-of-wedlock births increased.21  Significant improvement in the 
legal position of children born out of wedlock actually occurred decades 
earlier in Europe, when Norway, for example, began to permit children 
born out of wedlock to inherit from their biological fathers in 191622 and 
Sweden banned the use of “illegitimate” in official documents in 1917.23  
In the same year, illegitimacy as a status was abolished in Russia following 
the Bolshevik Revolution.24  More recently, even families headed by gay 
and lesbian couples who have adopted children or used assisted 
reproductive technologies have achieved a level of recognition previously 
unimagined.25 
Strides toward equal legal and social treatment have been of enormous 
benefit to children born out of wedlock, but discrimination and harassment 
against “illegitimate families” linger and thrive, whether in rules about who 
can marry26 and why,27 attitudes about who should be excluded from 
reproducing or adopting,28 perspectives on citizenship,29 and the fact that 
                                                          
 20. See Storrow, Equal Protection, supra note 4, at 541-42 (describing reforms that 
erased some of the stigma surrounding illegitimacy and how illegitimacy as a status fell 
out of favor).  See generally Storrow, Family Privacy, supra note 7, at 600-10. 
 21. See, e.g., James Kidd, The Law of Bastardy, 8 JURID. REV. 180, 180 (1896) 
(emphasizing the injustice and harshness of the law towards children born out of 
wedlock). 
 22. See Kiernan, supra note at 3, at 106.  A different source gives this date as 1915.  
See HENDRIX, supra note 2, at 149. 
 23. Kiernan, supra note 3, at 106. 
 24. See THE CHILD, supra note 3, at 2. 
 25. See id. at 592 (noting States where parentage determinations apply equally to 
same-sex couples or where stepparent adoption is available to same-sex couples to 
establish legal parentage in a de facto parent); Storrow, Marginalizing Adoption, supra 
note 19, at 512 n.218 (cataloging European countries that grant recognition to gay- and 
lesbian-headed families with children). 
 26. See JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES: LEGAL 
POLARIZATION AND THE CREATION OF CULTURE 132-38, 159-61 (2010) (discussing the 
role of debates over same-sex marriage in the culture wars). 
 27. Marriage is generally permitted for any reason or for no reason; however, a 
marriage entered into for the purpose of obtaining permanent resident immigration 
status is considered fraudulent.  See Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments Act of 
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639, 100 Stat. 3537. 
 28. See Richard F. Storrow, Medical Conscience and the Policing of Parenthood, 
16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 369, 372-75 (2010) [hereinafter Storrow, Medical 
Conscience] (discussing case of lesbian refused intra-uterine insemination by religious 
doctors); Storrow, Marginalizing Adoption, supra note 19, at 499-511 (critiquing the 
argument that married couples should receive preferential treatment in adoption); 
Storrow, Rescuing Children, supra note 11, at 367-69 (arguing that marriage is too 
faulty a proxy for parental fitness to adequately promote the best interests of children); 
Richard F. Storrow, The Bioethics of Prospective Parenthood: In Pursuit of the Proper 
4
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not all children receive the same entitlements.  As Barbara Stark has put it, 
“[w]hile laws renouncing illegitimacy are widespread, in practice the 
stigma remains strong in some parts of the world.”30  Even the United 
Nations’ Convention on the Rights of the Child, boasting 140 signatories,31 
does not explicitly outlaw discrimination against nonmarital children;32 
moreover, some countries that adopted the convention did so “without 
prejudice to national law provisions that discriminated between marital and 
nonmarital children.”33 
Lingering prejudicial attitudes toward and disparate treatment of children 
born out of wedlock can be traced to intractable notions of the importance 
of marriage for children and society.34  Despite the progress made toward 
dismantling disparate treatment based on “illegitimacy” of birth,  a new 
strain of disparate treatment of “illegitimate” children is emerging in 
response to the widespread use of reproductive technology to have 
children, particularly when it is used by families not headed by 
heterosexual couples.  Since reproductive technology removes sex from the 
reproductive process, this new form of illegitimacy has nothing to do with 
the fear that illicit sexual behavior will result in children.  It arises from the 
fear that children will be created without sex and in some cases will be born 
to gay and lesbian couples or single individuals, all with the participation 
and contribution of third parties.  This new illegitimacy is not reserved for  
                                                          
Standard for Gatekeeping in Infertility Clinics, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2283-84 (2007) 
(discussing patient-selection screening practices in infertility clinics). 
 29. See ANN LAQUER ESTIN AND BARBARA STARK, GLOBAL ISSUES IN FAMILY LAW 
92 (2007) (“Rules about legitimacy and paternity are grounded in assumptions about 
identity and citizenship that may be so deeply ingrained that they are unquestioned, 
accepted as ‘natural,’ in a particular culture.”); Solangel Maldonado, Illegitimate 
Harm: Law, Stigma, and Discrimination Against Nonmarital Children, 63 FLA. L. REV. 
345, 361-63 (2011) (discussing how, in ascribing citizenship, immigration law 
discriminates against nonmarital children on the basis of birth status). 
 30. Barbara Stark, Baby Girls from China in New York: A Thrice-Told Tale, 2003 
UTAH L. REV. 1231, 1295. 
 31. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 
U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/ 
Chapter%20IV/IV-11.en.pdf. 
 32. See id. at art. 2, 7. 
 33. D. MARIANNE BLAIR ET AL., FAMILY LAW IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 26 (2d 
ed. 2009). 
 34. See Storrow, Rescuing Children, supra note 11, at 351-56 (discussing 
arguments about the value of marriage in marriage movement rhetoric).  The value of 
marriage in marriage movement argumentation is often associated with financial or 
sexual benefits.  See, e.g., Robert Rector, How Not to Be Poor, 57 NAT’L REV. 26 
(2005), available at http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2005/10/how-not-
to-be-poor (higher income and superior standard of living).  The argument that 
marriage should carry a status superior to other relationships is not limited to those who 
oppose same-sex marriage.  See Nancy D. Polikoff, Making Marriage Matter Less: The 
ALI Domestic Partner Principles Are One Step in the Right Direction, 2004 U. CHI. 
LEGAL. F. 353, 359-62. 
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nontraditional families, however.35  The participation of third parties in the 
reproductive process calls into question the legitimacy of even the family 
of a married husband and wife who choose to reproduce in this fashion.  
The essence of the new illegitimacy, then, is what Elizabeth Bartholet has 
termed “biologism,” the view that those families in which the rearing 
couple have also made the gestational and genetic contribution to their 
children are more legitimate.36  Biologism, of course, means that married 
couples, unmarried couples, and single individuals who employ 
reproductive technology are all at risk of being seen as illegitimate and will 
suffer whatever disabilities the new illegitimacy might entail.   
Both the old and new illegitimacy are the tools of a politics of exclusion.  
Although the new illegitimacy is preoccupied with matters of citizenship37 
to a degree the old illegitimacy was not, both approaches to labeling a child 
or a family illegitimate reflect efforts to exclude them from the prerogatives 
legitimate families are deemed to merit.  This is particularly salient in the 
context of international commercial surrogacy in the same jurisdictions that 
have rejected the very notion of illegitimate children as archaic and 
                                                          
 35. Professor Elvia Arriola objects to the term “nontraditional” as applied in this 
context because it creates the impression that the family in question is itself 
illegitimate.  See Elvia R. Arriola, Law and the Family of Choice and Need, 35 U. 
LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 691, 694 (1997).  At the risk of reinforcing it, I use the term in 
this Article to underscore this unfortunate usage.  “Alternative” is sometimes used 
instead of “nontraditional.”  See, e.g., D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH 
APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 361 (3d ed. 2006). 
 36. See ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS: ADOPTION, INFERTILITY, AND THE 
NEW WORLD OF CHILD PRODUCTION 48, 93, 170 (1999) (noting that the law structures 
adoption in imitation of biology); CARP, supra note 2, at xiii, 4 (describing societal 
suspicion about parenting in the absence of genetic and gestational connections). 
 37. Citizenship also figures prominently in contemporary examples of other 
“outlawed children.”  See, e.g., Nobue Suzuki, Outlawed Children: Japanese Filipino 
Children, Legal Defiance and Ambivalent Citizenships, 83 PAC. AFF. 31, 41 (2010) 
(reporting on Japan’s practice, only recently dismantled, of disadvantaging children of 
Korean heritage).   
Like Europe, the United States is currently in the throes of battles over immigration.  
Compare MARK KRIKORIAN, THE NEW CASE AGAINST IMMIGRATION 1-2 (2008) 
(emphasizing that current immigration is not compatible with modern society), with 
JASON L. RILEY, LET THEM IN: THE CASE FOR OPEN BORDERS 2 (2008) (discussing that 
the targets of immigration have changed but the same concerns of the past persist).  
Birthright citizenship is a particularly contentious issue in the debate.  Some want to 
deny birthright citizenship to children born to illegal immigrants.  J. Richard Cohen, 
Campaigning to Rewrite 14th Amendment Based on Fearmongering Politics, Not Facts, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 28, 2011, 2:01 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/j-
richard-cohen/campaign-to-rewrite-14th-_b_841480.html.  They equate birthright 
citizenship in this context to “maternity tourism.”  See Jennifer Medina, Arriving as 
Pregnant Tourists, Leaving with American Babies, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/29/us/29babies.html.  In response to this concern, 
several European countries have ended birthright citizenship.  See Daniel González & 
Dan Nowicki, Birthright Citizenship Change Would Have Wide Effects, ARIZ. 
REPUBLIC (Mar. 20, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/ 
news/articles/2011/03/20/20110320birthright-citizenship-illegal-immigration.html.  
Thirty countries still have birthright citizenship; none are in Europe.  Id. 
6
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discriminatory.  Citizens of several European and Asian countries, 
including the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Spain, Belgium, and 
Japan have been refused travel documents for their newborn children by 
consular officials upon suspicion that they have engaged in international 
commercial surrogacy in the United States, India, or the Ukraine.  Upon 
arriving home (the children sometimes using passports issued by the 
countries in which they were born and at other times traveling on special 
humanitarian visas), parents have met with official refusal to recognize 
their parent-child relationships or to bestow citizenship upon the children.38  
In France alone, these refusals befall an estimated 400 French couples each 
year,39 leading lawyer Valérie Depadt-Sebag to designate the children “a 
new category of pariahs”40 that reintroduces a distinction between 
legitimate and illegitimate long ago expunged from the law.41  The 
response of several European and Asian nations to surrogate births reflects 
the tenacity of illegitimacy as a social and legal construct and proves that 
this most irresistible form of “othering”42 cannot simply be wiped out by 
commitment to equality and expungement of “illegitimacy” from the 
statutes of enlightened jurisdictions.43  The idea lingers on in “marriage 
movement” rhetoric deploying the message that children are better off with 
married parents and advocating preferential treatment for heterosexual 
married couples in matters of adoption and assisted reproduction.44  
This Article examines the new illegitimacy in Europe, a continent that, 
like the United States, has rejected discriminatory treatment of children 
born out of wedlock, but that embraces a much more robust commitment to 
marriage equality than we find in the United States.45  The new illegitimacy 
                                                          
        38.       See generally Rotman, supra note 1. 
     39.        Id. (estimating that 400 couples each year go abroad to use surrogacy). 
 40.   Charlotte Rotman, “Filles fantôme” en mal de noms [Girl Ghosts in Need of 
Name], La Libération, Feb. 18, 2010 (Fr.), http://www.liberation.fr/ 
societe/0101620002-filles-fantomes-en-mal-de-nom. 
            41.   Id. (quoting lawyer Nathalie Boudjerada). 
 42. See JENNY TEICHMAN, ILLEGITIMACY: AN EXAMINATION OF BASTARDY 12-13 
(1982) (“[B]y ostracizing illegitimate individuals and unmarried mothers, one 
demonstrates one’s own legitimacy and one’s loyalty to the sexual and property laws of 
the community.”). 
 43. In the United States, several jurisdictions have revised their statutes to remove 
the term “illegitimate” to describe children born out of wedlock.  See, e.g., Illegitimate 
Children, S.B. 65, 2004 Reg. Leg., (La. 2004).  In Europe, as early as 1917, the 
Swedish government banned the use of the term “illegitimate” in official documents.  
See Kiernan, supra note 3, at 106. 
 44. See Storrow, Rescuing Children, supra note 11, at 353-55 (discussing marriage 
movement arguments that children raised by married parents are better off than those 
not raised by married parents); see also Storrow, Marginalizing Adoption, supra note 
19, at 499-511 (discussing the argument that married heterosexual couples should 
receive preferential treatment in adoption). 
 45. See generally Nancy D. Polikoff, Recognizing Partners but Not Parents / 
7
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in Europe results from the entrenchment of the principle that the legal 
mother of a child is always the gestational mother and the concomitant 
widespread disapproval and legal prohibition of surrogacy.  When citizens 
of countries that ban surrogacy choose to pursue surrogacy elsewhere, they 
and their children meet with hostility, opprobrium, and exclusion upon 
their return.  The resort to surrogacy abroad subjects these families to legal 
disabilities that recall the disadvantageous treatment of children born out of 
wedlock received under what are now considered discriminatory legal 
regimes that violate human rights norms.  This Article also explores the 
resurgence of illegitimacy in Europe and reflects on the practice 
implications for attorneys advising couples and individuals who wish to use 
surrogacy in other countries. 
This Article unfolds in several parts.  Part I explores illegitimacy in legal 
history and includes a discussion of how assisted conception has very often 
been associated with adultery and illegitimacy.  With this history as a 
backdrop, Part II will explore the new illegitimacy in Europe and will trace 
in particular the cases that have forced France to reopen the national 
dialogue that in the 1990s resulted in the outright rejection of surrogacy.  
Part III will examine various responses to the problem of international 
commercial surrogacy.  Finally, this Article will consider the practice 
implications for attorneys assisting couples and individuals who wish to 
pursue surrogacy either in the United States or abroad. 
I.  ILLEGITIMACY IN LEGAL HISTORY 
Historically, the legal treatment of nonmarital children has been unkind.  
At its most egregious, canon and common law treated nonmarital children 
as the children of no one, meaning they had no connection to society or to 
any enforceable means of support and suffered a host of heavy legal 
disabilities.46  Roman law was not originally quite so harsh, requiring 
mothers who kept their illegitimate children to support them,47 but the later 
Christian emperors denied certain classes of illegitimate children all 
support.48  Roman law also developed grades of illegitimacy, separating 
nonmarital children into classes according to the gravity of the sexual 
offense that led to their birth.  Thus, children born of fornication were 
natural;49 those resulting from adultery were spurious.50  Natural 
                                                          
Recognizing Parents but Not Partners: Gay and Lesbian Family Law in Europe and 
the United States, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 711, 719-28 (2000). 
 46. See TEICHMAN, supra note 42, at 60 (referring to canon law and the common 
law); WITTE, supra note 3, at 122, 124. 
 47. WITTE, supra note 3, at 52. 
 48. Id. at 55. 
 49. Id. at 60; see TEICHMAN, supra note 42, at 54. 
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illegitimates “had certain legal claims on the father for support.”51  Since 
natural illegitimates were considered to arise from “natural” lapses of 
sexual judgment, it was determined that they should not suffer,52 and ways 
were devised for them to be legitimated.53  One of these was for the 
biological father to marry the biological mother.54  Formerly, if they did not 
marry during the pregnancy, the opportunity for legitimation of the child by 
marriage of his parents was lost.55  These methods of legitimation were 
described as “gifts” from both nature and law,56 nature providing the 
category of natural illegitimacy and the law providing the methods of 
legitimation. 
The treatment of spurious illegitimates was harsher.  The methods of 
legitimation available to the parents of natural illegitimates were 
unavailable to them.  Nonetheless, a spurious legitimate could be 
legitimated if the husband of the adulterous wife accepted the child as his 
own.57  There was a debate, however, about whether adoption could 
legitimate the spuriously illegitimate.  Justinian tried to abolish adoption, 
believing that if it were available as an avenue to the legitimation of 
spurious illegitimates it would encourage adultery and incest.58  The use of 
adoption to legitimate the spurious was affirmed, however, by Justinian’s 
successor Leo III.  Leo III wanted adoption to be available to everyone 
because of the benefits it bestowed upon parents and children alike; an 
adoptee’s rights were the same as other children or family members.59  This 
question of whether adoption could legitimate an illegitimate child 
continued to perplex jurists well into the twentieth century.  In 1959, a 
county court judge in England refused to allow the adoption of a child by 
his natural mother because “it could not be anything but contrary to the 
public interest to make it easier to remove the stigma of 
illegitimacy . . . .”60  The decision appears to have been based in part on the 
                                                          
 50. WITTE, supra note 3, at 55 
 51. TEICHMAN, supra note 42, at 54. 
 52. WITTE, supra note 3, at 60. 
 53. See id. at 61.  The distinction between natural and spurious illegitimates 
lingered in the laws of certain countries well into the Twentieth Century.  See, e.g., 
Johnston v. Ireland, 9697/82 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 28 (1986) (describing a statute that limited 
legitimation to children whose parents “could have been lawfully married to one 
another at the time of the child’s birth or at some time during the period of ten months 
preceding such birth”). 
 54. WITTE, supra note 3, at 61; TEICHMAN, supra note 42, at 54. 
 55. WITTE, supra note 3, at 55. 
 56. Id. at 62. 
 57. Id. at 53. 
 58. Id. at 62. 
 59. Id. at 64. 
 60. See TEICHMAN, supra note 42, at 73 (describing the case of In re D.). 
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notion that “only a man can legitimate a child” and the concern, similar to 
that voiced by Justinian, that adoption would become an avenue toward 
“universal legitimacy.”61 
The idea that the harsh treatment of illegitimate children was needed to 
deploy a strong message against illicit sexual conduct created a tension for 
policymakers from very early times.  Imposing vicarious liability on an 
employer is one thing, but relegating a child to an inferior status based on 
the sinfulness of the sexual act that led to his conception, all in an attempt 
to deter illicit sexual behavior, strikes us today as extraordinarily unjust and 
exceedingly naïve.  It would not be until the twentieth century,  that 
disapproval of differential treatment of children born out of wedlock would 
be enshrined in international human rights documents and judicial 
decisions. 
Disagreement about what direction the law of illegitimacy should take 
has led to a waxing and waning of the opprobrium directed at illegitimate 
children across the centuries.  The early Jewish teaching sharply limited 
those who could be labeled illegitimate and preferred to warn individuals 
that a child born out of wedlock, while he might not be illegitimate, could 
well suffer undesirable social consequences.62  Early Christian teachings on 
sex, marriage, and family relations laid the groundwork for the more 
expansive doctrine of illegitimacy that would emerge later. The early 
Christian view was that marriage was the only appropriate locus for sex 
and that even non-procreative sex within marriage should be avoided.63  
But this instruction did not lead inexorably to the condemnation of 
illegitimate children.  To the contrary, certain early church figures 
denounced such treatment.  The blame for illicit sex, according to this 
view, properly lay with the parents, not the children.64  Thus, like the early 
Jewish teachings, the early Christian teachings, taking account of the ill 
treatment that illegitimates would face due to the prevailing cultural norms, 
preferred to warn individuals away from extramarital sex.65 
We owe the more highly developed law of illegitimacy to the melding of 
the early Christian church’s concern with stamping out illicit sexual 
conduct with the Roman law’s complex doctrine of illegitimacy and its 
ramifications.66  The medieval mind found it quite easy to understand how 
children could be made to pay for the sins of their parents.67  The resulting 
                                                          
 61. Id. at 74. 
 62. See WITTE, supra note 3, at 25. 
 63. Id. at 28. 
 64. Id. at 38-39. 
 65. Id. at 42. 
 66. Id. at 47. 
 67. Id. at 101. 
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children were, after all, the witnesses or evidence of that evil.68  The extent 
to which the common law jurists bristled against what they saw as an 
internally inconsistent Roman system69 laid the groundwork for what today 
appears to have been “a Christian theology of sin run amok.”70  The Judeo-
Christian legal tradition desired above all that proscriptions on illicit sexual 
relations and their evidence—illegitimacy of birth—appear simply to be 
natural-law borrowings from the Bible.  There is some disagreement about 
this, but the point is that eventually the doctrine of illegitimacy was until 
very recently one of the most important tools used for expressing the 
importance of and channeling people into marital relationships.71 
A. The European Court of Human Rights 
It was the judiciary that played the most significant role in addressing the 
discrimination against nonmarital children that lingered in the latter half of 
the twentieth century.  Most of this discrimination was deployed by laws 
governing inheritance.  Inheritance by nonmarital children was forbidden 
because it would legitimate illicit sexual relations.  As a result, allowing 
nonmarital children to inherit was deemed contrary to a decedent’s 
presumed intentions. 
The European Court of Human Rights is considered Europe’s de facto 
constitutional court and the European Convention on Human Rights its de 
facto Bill of Rights.  The Court was created by a treaty, enacted at Rome in 
1950 and entered into force in 1953, to which all forty-seven members of 
the Council of Europe are bound.72  Membership in the Council of Europe, 
established to guarantee human rights,73 is obligatory for all states that wish 
to join the European Union.74   
The Court is vested with the duty to limit member states’ discretion to 
                                                          
 68. Id. at 123. 
 69. One example would be the Roman law prohibition on parental support for 
spurious illegitimates, id. at 125, but permitting spurious illegitimates to hold office 
because “[they have] committed no crime.”  Id. at 53. 
 70. See id. at 8 (commenting on the differences between today’s illegitimate 
children and those of the past). 
 71. See id. at xii (examining the history of illegitimacy and its relationship to the 
doctrine of marriage). 
 72. See A EUROPE OF RIGHTS: THE IMPACT OF THE ECHR ON NATIONAL LEGAL 
SYSTEMS 3 & n.1 (Helen Keller & Alex Stone Sweet eds., 2008) (claiming the 
European Convention on Human Rights is the most effective of its type in the world) 
[hereinafter A EUROPE OF RIGHTS]. 
 73. See MICHAEL D. GOLDHABER, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN COURT 
OF HUMAN RIGHTS 3 (2007) (providing that the guarantee of human rights defines 
European values and identity). 
 74. See A EUROPE OF RIGHTS, supra note 72, at 19 & n.44 (providing that 
membership in the European Court of Human Rights has been mandatory for all 
European Union states since the early 1990s). 
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interfere with the human rights enumerated in the Convention.  Although 
the effect of its jurisprudence is frequently contested, given that it “does not 
possess the authority to invalidate national legal norms judged to be 
incompatible with the Convention,”75 it nonetheless commands broad 
allegiance thanks to “the goodwill and good faith of most states.”76  The 
Court’s growing political legitimacy has earned it a sterling international 
reputation as “the most effective human rights regime in the world.”77  
Despite this reputation, the Court’s function can be tricky to carry out given 
the forces that led to its creation.  The reality is that the Court was created 
by a group of nations loathe to relinquish power to a supranational body, 
except in the area of human rights, which were on everyone’s mind in the 
post-World War II era.  Thus, the Court’s legitimacy may be due in part to 
the discretion or, in its parlance, the margin of appreciation, it grants states 
in matters about which a strong consensus has not yet emerged.  When 
evaluating whether a country’s laws violate the Convention, the Court 
applies the doctrine of proportionality.  As its name suggests, 
proportionality refers to the balance member states must strike between the 
objectives of their laws and the means they choose to realize those 
objectives.78  Proportionality requires that the restriction align closely with 
the goal the restriction is intended to achieve.79  This standard does not 
prohibit a state from passing laws in order to achieve ethical objectives 
about which there may be disagreement, but it does prevent a legislature 
from imposing restrictions that have too little to do with the achievement of 
those normative goals.80  As the margin of appreciation narrows and the 
demands of the proportionality standard increase, too loose a fit between a 
law’s objective and the legal means chosen to bring that objective about 
                                                          
 75. See id. at 13 (arguing that the European Court of Human Rights remains 
internationally focused and fails to take up a form of constitutional authority in dealing 
with certain Convention rights). 
 76. See id. at 14 (indicating the European Court of Human Rights would fail 
without the support of the States). 
 77. See id. at 3 (referring to the Court’s consistent upgrades in areas of new rights, 
increased powers, and improved communication); see also GOLDHABER, supra note 73, 
at 2 (citing several leading jurists who praise the Court and Convention as the most 
developed and best in the world). 
 78. See Arturas Panomariovas & Egidijus Losis, Proportionality: From the 
Concept to the Procedure, 2 JURISPRUDENCE 257, 263 (2010) (defining proportionality 
in jurisprudence as a means of justice focused on protecting individual rights). 
 79. See YUTAKA ARAI-TAKAHASHI, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE AND 
THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ECHR 225 (2002) 
(providing that the goals of restrictions change over time, as does the proportionality 
used to evaluate such restrictions). 
 80. See Richard F. Storrow, The Pluralism Problem in Cross Border Reproductive 
Care, 25 HUMAN REPRODUCTION 2939 (2010) (indicating that proportionality is 
required in order to achieve a balance between the goals and methods used to achieve 
those goals). 
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will constitute a violation of the Convention.  Proportionality, then, 
prevents majoritarian perspectives on volatile issues from automatically 
smothering alternative points of view.  By insisting on proportionality, 
democracy respects autonomy in matters of great human importance and 
strives to avoid the oppression of minority points of view.  As R. Beddard 
sees it, “[t]he difficulties of balancing the wishes of the individual and 
those of the community as a whole are not to be underestimated and may 
seem to encapsulate the major decision decision-making complexity of 
human rights law.”81  The most difficult cases, in the view of one judge, are 
cases involving conceptions of the family based in deeply rooted religious, 
ideological, or traditional convictions.82 
A case brought against Ireland on the question of illegitimacy of birth 
probably best illustrates the difficulty of the Court’s task.  Roy Johnston 
was legally separated from his wife and had been living with his domestic 
partner Janice Williams-Johnston and their daughter Nessa for a number of 
years.  In Ireland at the time of Johnston, only families based on marriage 
received protection under the Constitution.83  Ireland also prohibited 
divorce, the law reflecting a religious position in favor of permanent 
marriage.  In doing so, it ignored the reality of dependency that was so 
evident in the Williams-Johnston’s living arrangement,84 requiring them to 
take additional steps “to regularize their situation.”85  Furthermore, the law 
denied them any means of solidifying their bond to account for their 
interdependency or to remove the legal disabilities and stigma of 
illegitimacy placed upon Nessa. 
The law treated Nessa differently from children born in wedlock in a 
number of significant ways.  Although Janice Williams-Johnston was 
recognized as Nessa’s legal mother for all purposes under the doctrine of 
mater semper certa est,86 Tessa could inherit in intestacy from her mother 
only if her mother had no legitimate children.87  Roy Johnston’s position 
vis-à-vis Nessa was more tenuous.  Although he was registered as the 
child’s father, he had no “paternal affiliation” with Nessa and thus was 
                                                          
 81. See RALPH BEDDARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND EUROPE 99 (3d ed. 1993) 
(suggesting that the Strausbourg Court has a difficult responsibility in evaluating the 
complex issues related to private life). 
 82. See Kroon and Others v. Netherlands, 19 E.H.R.R. 263, 287 (1995) (Morenilla 
J., dissenting) (arguing cohesion of the family and preservation of  the family unit 
should not be overly interfered with by the State when recognizing natural father 
rights). 
 83. Johnston v. Ireland, 9 Eur. Ct. H.R. 203, ¶ 28 (1987). 
 84. Id. ¶ 12. 
 85. Id. ¶¶ 12, 66, 71. 
 86. Id. ¶ 25. 
 87. Id. ¶ 31. 
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recognized as her father only for very limited purposes.88  For Nessa, this 
meant that she was barred by law from inheriting in intestacy from her 
father, a rule intended “to strengthen the protection of the family.”89  
Perhaps the most distressing aspect of the law relating to Nessa was that it 
provided that she could not be legitimated since her parents could not have 
been married to each other at either the time she was born or the time she 
was conceived.90 
The parties claimed violations of their right to private and family life and 
to be free from discrimination.  Although the Court made clear that, unlike 
the Irish Constitution, the protections of the Convention extended to the 
“‘illegitimate’ family,”91 it nonetheless determined that the Convention 
guaranteed no right to divorce.92  This determination did not dispose of 
Nessa’s claims, however.  Quoting from its opinion in Marckx v. Belgium, 
decided before the European consensus in favor of doing away with the 
disparate treatment of nonmarital children was as solid as it was at the time 
Johnston was decided, the Court reiterated the importance of state’s 
establishing legal safeguards geared toward integrating nonmarital children 
into their families.  It held that Ireland’s affording Nessa and her parents no 
means whatsoever to bring her treatment under the law into line with the 
legal treatment of legitimate children amounted to a failure to respect the 
Williams-Johnston’s family life.93  This was not meant to convey that 
member states cannot go about expressing respect for family life in 
different ways, just that they cannot allow a legal presumption to prevail 
over a “biological and social reality.”94 
A later case against the Netherlands, Kroon, raised the claim that the rule 
disallowing a biological father from establishing his paternity of a child 
where the mother of the child was married to a man who did not deny 
paternity was a violation of the right to family life guaranteed by Article 8 
of the Convention.  In this case, the child Samir was born to Catharina and 
Ali at a time when Catharina was still married to Omar, from whom she 
                                                          
 88. Id. ¶¶ 11, 26. 
 89. Id. ¶ 31. 
 90. Id. ¶¶ 28, 70(c).  Note the similarity of this rule to the treatment of “spurious” 
illegitimates under Roman law.  WITTE, supra note 3, at 53. 
 91. Johnston, 9 Eur. Ct. H.R. 203, ¶¶ 55(b), 56.  Note the similarity to the 
statement made in Michael H. v. Gerald D. that “[t]he family unit accorded traditional 
respect in our society, which we have referred to as the ‘unitary family,’ is typified, of 
course, by the marital family, but also includes the household of unmarried parents and 
their children.”  491 U.S. 110, 124 n.3 (1989). 
 92. See Johnston, 9 Eur. Ct. H.R. 203, ¶¶ 54, 57 (providing there is no right to 
divorce, although divorce is recognized under the Convention). 
 93. See id. ¶¶ 75, 76. 
 94. See Kroon and Others v. Netherlands, 297-C Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994). 
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was separated.95  Catharina thereafter divorced Omar,96 but neither she nor 
Ali wished to be married.97  They thus could not pursue the option of 
Omar’s adopting Samir as a stepparent.  The government thereafter rejected 
Catharina and Ali’s attempts to establish Ali’s paternity of Samir.98  Under 
these circumstances, the law permitted Samir’s paternity to be established 
only if Omar denied paternity,99 but Omar’s whereabouts were unknown.100  
Ali and Catharina subsequently had three other children.101 Although the 
Court was sensitive to the margin of appreciation that the state enjoys in 
these matters and that a “fair balance must be struck between the 
competing interests of the individual and of the community as a whole,” 
nonetheless “[w]here the existence of a family tie with a child has been 
established, the state must act in a manner calculated to enable that tie to be 
developed” and for the child to be integrated within the family.102  In 
Netherlands’ refusal to do so, the Court found far too rigid an application 
of the marital presumption of paternity.103  The possibility of adoption was 
deemed not to be “sufficient to eliminate the effects on their private and 
family life created by the impossibility to contest the legal paternity.”104   
 The Kroon and Johnston cases stand for the proposition that “Article 8 is 
not confined solely to marriage-based relationships”105 because family life 
may have biological and social realities and components that have nothing 
to do with marriage.106  Among these may figure, living together107 and 
“other factors [that would] serve to demonstrate that a relationship has 
sufficient constancy.”108  These cases illustrate the robust protection the 
European Convention on Human Rights guarantees children born out of 
                                                          
 95. See id. ¶¶ 7-9. 
 96. See id. ¶ 9. 
 97. See id. ¶ 30. 
 98. See id. ¶¶ 10, 11-14. 
 99. See id. ¶¶ 10, 18. 
 100. See id. ¶ 8. 
 101. See id. ¶ 15. 
 102. See id. ¶ 36. 
103. See id. ¶ 31.  We can readily see how Kroon stands in opposition to Michael 
H., since it essentially holds that a natural father has the right to challenge the 
presumption undergirding a legal father’s paternity. 
 104. See id. ¶ 42. 
 105. See id. ¶ 31. 
 106. See id. ¶¶ 30, 40. 
 107. See Berrehab v. The Netherlands, App. No. 10730/84 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1988) 
(establishing that cohabitation is not required for family life between parents and minor 
children). 
 108. See Khan v. United Kingdom, App. No. 47486/06 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010) 
(recognizing that the existence of family ties in the United Kingdom meant that a 
Pakistani national who had moved to the United Kingdom could not be deported). 
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wedlock and their families against discriminatory laws.  Indeed 
illegitimacy now constitutes a “suspect category” calling for the most 
intense level of review.109  Yutaka Arai comments: 
Another area in which an audacious approach is consistently applied is in 
discrimination against “illegitimate” children.  As in issues of gender 
quality, the effective use of evolutive interpretation and the stringent 
examination of justifications for any differential treatment demonstrate 
an assertive policy of review.  The Strasbourg organs are willing to 
impose a weighty burden of proof on a respondent State.  In relation to 
this suspect category as well, the scope of the margin shrinks to the 
vanishing point.110  
B. The United States Supreme Court 
The law in the United States has evolved in the last twenty-five years to 
recognize that innocent children should not suffer disinheritance as a result 
of their parents’ indiscretions.111  This reform in the law arose largely due 
to a mandate from the United States Supreme Court making clear that 
classifications based on a child’s nonmarital status that do not substantially 
relate to important legislative goals violate the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.112  Legislatures responded to this mandate by 
enacting statutory frameworks that align the treatment accorded nonmarital 
children with that accorded marital children.113  Despite this sea change in 
the inheritance rights of nonmarital children, the law continues to favor 
marital relationships in this context.  Only parents unwed at the time of 
their child’s birth are deprived of the opportunity to inherit from that child 
unless they recognize or support the child.  The law continues to 
disadvantage nonmarital children in other ways as well.114 
                                                          
 109. See TAKAHASHI, supra note 79, at 225. 
 110. Id. at 224 (citations omitted). 
 111. See Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972) (“[I]mposing 
disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that 
legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing.  
Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is 
an ineffectual—as well as an unjust—way of deterring the parent.  Courts are 
powerless to prevent the social opprobrium suffered by these hapless children, but the 
Equal Protection Clause does enable us to strike down discriminatory laws relating to 
status of birth where . . . the classification is justified by no legitimate state interest, 
compelling or otherwise.”). 
 112. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (“Between these extremes of 
rational basis review and strict scrutiny lies a level of intermediate scrutiny, which 
generally has been applied to discriminatory classifications based on sex or 
illegitimacy.”). 
 113. See, e.g., Milton C. Regan, Jr., Marriage at the Millennium, 33 FAM. L.Q. 647, 
659 (1999) (stating that illegitimacy is not a suspect constitutional classification, so that 
children of unmarried parents enjoy most of the benefits available to those whose 
parents are married). 
 114. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 43-8-48(2) (2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 508(2) 
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Under the common law, a nonmarital child could inherit from neither her 
mother nor her father.115  Most states have passed laws allowing nonmarital 
children to inherit from their mothers,116 but, by and large, nonmarital 
children still face legal obstacles to inheriting from their fathers.117  This 
disparate treatment was not ameliorated, as some courts claimed,118 by the 
existence of the father’s power at any time to execute a will naming his 
nonmarital child a beneficiary.119  Not only was the use of “children” in a 
will construed so as to exclude illegitimate children,120 but state statutes 
deprived a nonmarital child of specific bequests from his parents either per 
se121 or upon challenge by the testator’s surviving spouse and marital 
children.122 The Supreme Court, in Labine v. Vincent,123 rejected a 
constitutional challenge to these statutes, reasoning that it had no authority 
                                                          
(2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-109(b) (2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
391.105(1)(c)(2) (West 2012); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-109(2)(iii) (West 
2012); MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-1-15(3)(d)(i) (2012); MO. REV. STAT. § 474.060.2(2) 
(West 2012); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2309(2)(ii) (2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-
109(2)(ii) (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-2-105(a)(2)(B) (2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 
64.1-5.1(3)(b) (2012) (denying fathers’ inheritance rights through their nonmarital 
progeny unless they support or acknowledge them); Maldonado, supra note 29, at 345 
(documenting the continuing social stigma of illegitimacy and the continuing legal 
discrimination in the area of postsecondary education support, immigration and 
intestate succession). 
 115. See In re Estate of Karas, 329 N.E.2d 234, 236 (Ill. 1975) (citing 1 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *456 (“Under the common law an illegitimate was 
considered filius nullius [the child of nobody].”)); JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, 
TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 115 (2009). 
 116. See In re Karas, 329 N.E.2d at 237 (quoting Smith v. Garber, 121 N.E. 173, 
175 (Ill. 1918)). 
 117. See DUKEMINIER, supra note 115, at 115.  In Trimble, the Court described these 
new laws as attempting to establish a system of intestate inheritance more just to 
illegitimate children and, at the same time, protecting against spurious claims of 
paternity.  Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 776 (1976). 
 118. See, e.g., In re Karas, 329 N.E.2d at 240. 
 119. See In re Brown, 388 So. 2d 1151, 1153 (La. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. 
Brown v. Brown, 450 U.S. 998 (1981). 
 120. See Brisbin v. Huntington, 103 N.W. 144, 147 (Iowa 1905) (“The decisions are 
unanimous that, in the absence of statutory provisions modifying the common law with 
respect to illegitimate children, the words ‘issue,’ ‘child,’ or ‘children,’ found in a will 
or statute, whether qualified by the word ‘lawful’ or not, are to be construed as only 
those who are legitimate, and, if others are intended, this must be deduced from the 
language employed, without resort to extrinsic facts.”). 
 121. See, e.g., Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 537 n.13 (1971) (citing LA. CIV. 
CODE ANN. art. 1488 (1870) (repealed 1978) (noting the alimentary limitation for 
adulterous or incestuous children). 
 122. See Gore v. Clarke, 16 S.E. 614, 616 (S.C. 1892) (citing a statute declaring 
void any bequest of more than one-fourth of a testator’s estate to that testator’s 
illegitimate child “provided the wife or child alone can raise the question”); Bennett v. 
Toler, 56 Va. (15 Gratt.) 588 (1860) (“[I]n a great majority of cases the testator is 
presumed to prefer, as objects of his bounty, legitimate children to bastards.”). 
 123. See Labine, 401 U.S. at 532 (holding that a state’s interest in promoting family 
life rationally supports its disallowance of an intestate share for an unacknowledged 
illegitimate child). 
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to interfere with a state’s intestate succession laws124 and that these laws 
were rationally based on the desire of states to encourage family 
relationships.125 
After deciding no fewer than nine disputes involving wrongful death and 
public benefits statutes containing classifications based on illegitimacy,126 
the Supreme Court, in Trimble v. Gordon,127 reviewed an Illinois intestate 
succession statute that disallowed illegitimate children from inheriting from 
their biological fathers.128  The case was an appeal by a nonmarital child 
from the probate court’s rejection of her petition to be declared an heir of 
her father’s estate.129  The Supreme Court of Illinois, ruling orally from the 
bench immediately after oral argument, affirmed the decision.130 
While not overruling Labine, the Trimble Court indirectly disapproved 
of it,131 stating that other decisions had expressly provided that no “State 
may attempt to influence the actions of men and women by imposing 
sanctions on the children born of their illegitimate relationships.”132  The 
Court also hinted that Labine may have gone too far in approving, based on 
the state’s asserted interest in the orderly administration of estates, the 
complete exclusion of nonmarital children from intestate inheritance.133  
Likewise, the Court expressed its view that proof problems in inheritance 
claims by nonmarital children should not be used to excuse invidious 
discrimination against them.134  Finally, the Trimble Court deemed the fact 
that the father could have made a will and the claim that the intestacy 
statute reflected his “presumed intent” wholly irrelevant to the question at 
hand.135 
As radical as Trimble seemed, it, nonetheless, did not stand for the 
proposition that, to inherit from their intestate fathers, nonmarital children 
must have precisely the same rights as marital children.  The Court 
                                                          
 124. Id. 
 125. See id. at 536 n.6. 
 126. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 n.11 (1976) (citing cases).  See 
generally Susan E. Satava, Discrimination Against the Unacknowledged Illegitimate 
Child and the Wrongful Death Statute, 25 CAP. U. L. REV. 933, 939-69 (1996) 
(summarizing cases and contexts). 
 127. See Trimble, 430 U.S. at 762. 
 128. See id. at 764-65 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 12 (1975) (current version at 
755 ILL. COMP.  STAT. ANN. 5 / 2-1 (West 2012)). 
 129. See id. 
 130. See id. at 765. 
 131. See id. at 777 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  Note, however, that four justices 
dissented in Trimble, deeming Labine dispositive. 
 132. See id. at 769 (majority opinion). 
 133. See id. at 767 n.12. 
 134. See id. at 772. 
 135. Id. at 774-75. 
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admitted that difficulties in proving paternity “might justify a more 
demanding standard for illegitimate children claiming under their fathers’ 
estates than that required either for illegitimate children claiming under 
their mothers’ estates or for legitimate children generally.”136  The Court, 
thus, left room for a veritable welter of new litigation presenting the 
question of when the different standard would become too demanding to 
pass constitutional muster.137 
Both New York and Texas defended their particularly demanding 
standards in cases reaching the Supreme Court.  New York’s statute 
provided that nonmarital children could not inherit in intestacy from their 
fathers unless, during the father’s lifetime, a court issued an order of 
filiation initiated during the mother’s pregnancy or before the child’s 
second birthday.138  This provision was challenged in Lalli v. Lalli139 by the 
son of an intestate father who openly had acknowledged his paternity.140  In 
declaring New York’s statute constitutional,141 albeit imperfect,142 the 
Court noted that its purpose was not to steer people into legitimate 
relationships143 but to promote the orderly administration of estates.144  The 
Court commented that, because the unexpected appearance of a nonmarital 
child claiming a share of an estate could disrupt the stability of orderly 
administration,145 New York’s restriction on the ability of nonmarital 
children to inherit was justified.  Also compelling to the Court were the 
peculiar proof problems that paternity posed.  Whereas maternity is a 
foregone conclusion in most cases, questions of paternity invite fraudulent 
claims and harassing litigation146—especially where fathers and their 
nonmarital children do not constitute “a formal family unit.”147  The Court 
felt that these important concerns were addressed appropriately by New 
York’s statutory scheme because it required the filiation order to be issued 
during the putative father’s lifetime.148  This circumscribed the time within 
                                                          
 136. Id. at 770; cf. Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852, 855 (1986) (“[T]he state[’s] 
interest in the orderly disposition of decedents’ estates may justify the imposition of 
special requirements upon an illegitimate child.”). 
 137. See, e.g., Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 266 (1978). 
 138. See id. at 261 n.2 (citing N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2(2) 
(McKinney 1998)). 
 139. Id. at 259. 
 140. Id. at 262-63. 
 141. Id. at 276. 
 142. Id. at 272-73. 
 143. See id. at 267 (“[T]he marital status of the parents is irrelevant.”). 
 144. Id. at 267-68. 
 145. Id. at 270. 
 146. Id. at 271. 
 147. Id. at 269. 
 148. See id. at 271 (arguing that the accurate resolution of paternity claims is 
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which illegitimate children could present their claims and allowed the 
putative father to defend himself against false claims of paternity.149  The 
Lalli Court did not address the constitutionality of the statute’s two-year 
limitation specifically,150 a choice Justice Blackmun, in his concurrence, 
suggested would haunt the Court as legislatures questioned whether their 
particular statutes were more like the one in Trimble or the one in Lalli.151 
In dissent, four justices argued that the decision was an unjustified 
retreat from Trimble in that it made it likely that nonmarital children would 
never inherit from their fathers in intestacy.152  As if responding to this 
dissent, later New York cases specifically found the statute’s two-year 
requirement unconstitutional.153  Since its amendment in 1981, New York’s 
statutory scheme has allowed, in addition to the court order of filiation,154 a 
nonmarital child to inherit from his natural father if the father: (1) “has 
signed an instrument acknowledging paternity,”155 (2) “paternity has been 
established by clear and convincing evidence and the father of the child has 
openly and notoriously acknowledged the child as his own,”156 or (3) 
“paternity has been established by clear and convincing evidence . . . 
derived from a genetic marker test.”157  These criteria incorporate some of 
the suggestions Justice Brennan made in his dissent in Lalli and reflect the 
statutory scheme that many states, including Texas, subsequently have 
adopted.158 
                                                          
enhanced by adjudicating these claims during the putative father’s lifetime). 
 149. See id. at 271-72 (showing that permitting the putative father to “defend his 
reputation” and respond to a paternity claim facilitates the administration of his estate 
and minimizes the success of fraudulent assertions of paternity). 
 150. See id. at 267 n.5 (explaining that the constitutionality of the two-year 
limitation is not at issue because the appellant never commenced a paternity 
proceeding). 
 151. See id. at 277 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (stating that until Trimble is 
overruled, the validity of related statutes is questionable until courts evaluate them one 
by one). 
 152. See id. at 277-78 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (explaining that it is unimaginable 
under the New York statute that nonmarital children who are acknowledged and 
voluntarily supported by their fathers “would ever inherit intestate”). 
 153. See, e.g., In re McLeod, 430 N.Y.S.2d 782, 785 (Sur. Ct. 1980); In re Harris, 
414 N.Y.S.2d 612, 615 (Sur. Ct. 1979) (“[I]f a literal and stringent application of the 
two year limitation . . . were accepted, it would require a finding that this portion of the 
statute is constitutionally offensive to the right of the infant to equal protection of the 
law.”); In re Angelis, 410 N.Y.S.2d 521, 524 (Sur. Ct. 1978). 
 154. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2(a)(2)(A) (McKinney 2012). 
 155. Id. § 4-1.2(a)(2)(B). 
 156. Id. § 4-1.2(a)(2)(C)(ii). 
 157. Id. § 4-1.2(a)(2)(C)(i). 
 158. Many of these statutes track the language of the Uniform Parentage Act.  See 
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201(b)(2)-(3) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 309 (2001) (stating 
a paternity is established through an effective acknowledgement of paternity by the 
father or through adjudication of the man’s paternity). 
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Texas was particularly recalcitrant in preventing nonmarital children 
from claiming a paternal inheritance and has had a history of other 
draconian laws disfavoring illegitimate children.159  In 1977, the year 
Trimble was decided, Texas still had a statute depriving an illegitimate 
child of any claim to a paternal inheritance unless her parents had married 
after her birth.160  In 1978, Delynda Reed, born out of wedlock, claimed a 
share of the estate of her father Prince Ricker, who had died four months 
before Trimble was decided.161  The Texas courts denied her claim, ruling 
that Trimble did not operate retroactively to encompass claims to estates 
opened before the decision in Trimble but distributed afterwards.162  The 
Supreme Court reversed, ruling that, although the claim of a nonmarital 
child to a share in her father’s estate may impose upon the child “special 
requirements,”163 the timing of Reed’s claim had no impact on the state’s 
interest in the orderly administration of Ricker’s estate. 
In response to Trimble and later cases, the Texas legislature passed a 
series of amendments to both the Texas Probate Code and the Texas 
Family Code.  In 1977, the Texas legislature amended the Texas Probate 
Code to allow a nonmarital child to claim a paternal inheritance only if the 
parents had married after the child’s birth or the father voluntarily had 
legitimated the child.164  In 1979, the legislature again amended the Texas 
Probate Code to allow the child to be legitimated by a court order of 
paternity provided for by the Texas Family Code.165  Despite this reform, 
Texas’s statute of limitations for a nonmarital child’s paternity action 
required the child to bring the action before her first birthday, a 
requirement characterized as “less than generous” in Mills v. Habluetzel,166 
                                                          
 159. See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973) (striking down Texas’s rule 
disallowing illegitimates a right of support from their biological fathers, as an 
unconstitutional violation of the Equal Protection Clause).  In Mills v. Habluetzel, the 
Supreme Court’s follow-up to Gomez, the Court struck down, as a violation of equal 
protection, a Texas statute of limitations requiring a nonmarital child to bring a suit for 
support before reaching his first birthday.  446 U.S. 91, 101 (1982).  The Court held 
that the truncated limitations period afforded nonmarital children no reasonable 
opportunity to assert their claims and bore no substantial relationship to the state’s 
interest in frustrating stale or fraudulent claims of paternity.  See id. at 100-01. 
 160. See Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852, 853 (1986) (citing TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. 
§ 42 (Vernon 1956) (stating that a nonmarital child whose parents never married could 
only inherit “from his mother and from his maternal kindred . . . .”)). 
 161. See id. 
 162. See id. at 853 n.3 (citing Reed v. Campbell, 682 S.W.2d 697, 700 (Tex. App. 
1984)).  Texas courts apparently had applied Trimble to claims pending as of the date 
of the decision.  See Reed, 682 S.W.2d at 856 (citing Winn v. Lackey, 618 S.W.2d 910 
(Tex. App. 1981); Lovejoy v. Lillie, 569 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. App. 1978)). 
 163. See Reed, 476 U.S. at 855. 
 164. See Dickson v. Simpson, 807 S.W.2d 726, 726-727 (Tex. 1991). 
 165. See id. at 727. 
 166. 456 U.S. 91, 94 (1982). 
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a Supreme Court case striking it down as a violation of equal protection.167  
While Mills was pending before the Supreme Court, the Texas legislature 
increased the limit to age four, and, in 1983, the legislature again increased 
the time frame to two years after a child becomes an adult.168  The Texas 
Probate Code was amended in 1987 to provide for post-death 
determinations of paternity in the probate court,169 and, finally, in 1989, the 
legislature again amended the Texas Family Code to make the more liberal 
statute of limitations passed in 1983 applicable to “children for whom a 
paternity action was brought but dismissed because a statute of limitations 
of less than eighteen years was in effect.”170  The present law reflecting this 
series of amendments allows nonmarital children to bring a paternity suit 
within two years of their reaching the age of majority or, “without regard to 
a paternity determination under the Family Code or voluntary 
legitimization by the father,”171 to establish paternity by clear and 
convincing evidence in the probate court172 either in the course of an 
existing probate173 or by attacking a judgment of heirship within four 
years.174  These statutes of limitations were, like the limitations imposed by 
the statute in Lalli, justified by Texas’s interest in the “orderly 
administration” of estates and the validity of property ownership.175 
These legislative reforms suggest that the contemporary view that there 
are no illegitimate children, only illegitimate parents,176 has led to abolition 
of the long-standing bias in favor of nuclear families that perpetuated the 
stigma of illegitimacy.  But instead of completely abolishing this bias, 
                                                          
 167. Id. at 101. 
 168. See In re Sicko, 900 S.W.2d 863, 865 (Tex. App. 1995). 
 169. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 42(b)(1) (West 2012); Turner v. Nesby, 848 
S.W.2d 872, 874 (Tex. App. 1993). 
 170. In re Sicko, 900 S.W.2d at 865 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.01(b) (West 
Supp. 1995) (repealed 1995)). 
 171. Id. at 866. 
 172. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 42(b)(1). 
 173. See In re Chavana, 993 S.W.2d 311, 317 (Tex. App. 1999) (stating that because 
the right to inherit is separate from the right to establish paternity, and to seek financial 
support can only be determined after the putative father has died, the action must be 
brought at the time of probate). 
 174. See Turner, 848 S.W.2d at 878 (holding that the plain language of section 55(a) 
of the Texas Probate Code necessitates that the four-year statute of limitations for an 
heir to contest a judgment of heirship begins to run at the time of the judgment). 
 175. See Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852, 856 (1986) (announcing retroactive 
application of Trimble to the Texas Probate Code). 
 176. See In re Cherkas, 506 A.2d 1029, 1031 (R.I. 1986) (“The sweep of the various 
opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States in this area may be summarized by 
a statement of principle widely accepted in the modern era.  Although there may be 
illegitimate parents, there is, in justice, no such person as an illegitimate child.  The 
very term ‘bastard’ is illustrative of the medieval notion that the sins of the father 
would be visited upon his hapless offspring.  If such a concept was ever accepted, it is 
time, and past time, that it be wholly discredited and repudiated.”). 
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states have elected to shift the stigma of illegitimacy from illegitimate 
children to their parents and, in this way, have found a new means of 
promoting nuclear families.  Prevented by the Supreme Court on equal 
protection grounds from disfavoring nonmarital children, several states 
have passed legislation denying fathers inheritance rights from or through 
their nonmarital progeny unless they supported or acknowledged such 
children.177  Determining that fathers who do not treat their nonmarital 
children as their own have no entitlement to inherit from those children’s 
estates, the Georgia legislature enacted such a statute.178  The statute 
disallowed the father of a nonmarital child from inheriting from or through 
that child if paternity had not been established through presumption or 
court order, or if the father “failed or refused openly to treat the child as his 
own or failed or refused to provide support for the child.”179  The statute 
also expressly recognized the right of a nonmarital child’s mother to inherit 
from the child under any circumstances,180 and it made no mention of 
married parents who abandon their children. 
The statute was invoked by the plaintiff in Rainey v. Chever.181  In that 
case, Robert Lee Chever’s twenty-year-old nonmarital child was killed in 
an automobile accident.182  Zenobia Hamilton Rainey, the child’s mother, 
moved the court to deny the child’s father heirship status even though his 
paternity had been established.183  Chever, who apparently never had 
supported his son or played any role in his son’s life,184 responded by 
challenging the statute on federal and state equal protection grounds.185  
The trial court agreed with Chever, and the Georgia Supreme Court 
affirmed, noting that the statutory means chosen to advance the state’s 
interest in encouraging fathers to take responsibility for their nonmarital 
children were not substantially related to the classification that penalized 
fathers but not similarly situated mothers.186 
The Supreme Court denied certiorari over the strenuous dissent of 
Justice Thomas, who, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, 
described a host of social ills attributable to the high incidence of out-of-
                                                          
 177. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
 178. GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-4 (1997) (amended 2002). 
 179. Id. § 53-2-4(b)(2). 
 180. Id. § 53-2-4(a). 
 181. 510 S.E.2d 823, 823 (Ga. 1999). 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. See Rainey v. Chever, 527 U.S. 1044, 1045 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(discussing how Chever did not meet his son until he was fifteen years old and had 
never initiated a visit with his son). 
 185. Rainey, 510 S.E.2d at 823. 
 186. See id. at 824. 
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wedlock births.187  Claiming that the Georgia Supreme Court had failed to 
adhere to Supreme Court precedent,188 Justice Thomas declared that the 
court should have defined the issue as whether a distinction between fathers 
who do and fathers who do not support and acknowledge their nonmarital 
children had a rational basis.189  Based on this statement of the issue, 
Justice Thomas concluded that the Georgia Supreme Court improperly had 
applied heightened scrutiny in its review of the statute’s constitutionality.190 
Although the opinion of the dissenting justices has no legal force, it is 
remarkable that both it and the Georgia Supreme Court’s opinion never 
fully explored the distinction between classifications stigmatizing 
nonmarital children and those stigmatizing their parents.  This distinction 
was reflected, if not fully appreciated, in two decisions the Supreme Court 
made early in its history of invalidating legislation denying entitlements 
because of illegitimacy. 
In Levy v. Louisiana,191 the Court struck down Louisiana’s denial of 
standing to nonmarital children who wished to sue for the wrongful death 
of their parent.192  The Court found no rational relationship between the 
prohibition and the lower court’s assertion that it discouraged “bringing 
children into the world out of wedlock.”193  In Glona v. American 
Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co.,194 recognized as the reverse of 
Levy,195 the Court struck down a classification disallowing a mother from 
                                                          
 187. See Rainey, 527 U.S. at 1044 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (providing an expert’s 
view that out-of-welock births can lead to “lower newborn health and increased risk of 
early infant death; retarded cognitive and verbal development; lowered educational 
achievement; lowered levels of job attainment; increased behavioral problems; lowered 
ability to control impulses; warped social development; increased dependence on 
welfare; increased exposure to crime; and increased risk of being physically or sexually 
abused”). 
 188. See id. at 1046 (claiming the state court decision to be “inconsistent with this 
court’s prior decisions”). 
 189. See id. (demonstrating that the Court has analyzed similar cases under rational 
basis review, therefore the lower court’s use of strict scrutiny was in error); cf. Parham 
v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 355 n.7 (1979) (“[T]he Georgia statute at issue here excludes 
only those fathers who have not legitimated their children.”); Alvarez v. Dist. Dir. of 
INS, 539 F.2d 1220, 1224 (9th Cir. 1976) (asserting that strict scrutiny in the alien 
context is not required when classifications are made within groups of aliens rather 
than between aliens and citizens). 
 190. See Rainey, 527 U.S. at 1047 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 191. 391 U.S. 68 (1968). 
 192. Id. at 70 (reasoning that because nonmarital children are “clearly ‘persons’ 
within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,” 
they have standing to sue for the wrongful death of their parent). 
 193. Id. at 72. 
 194. 391 U.S. 73 (1968). 
 195. See Burnett v. Camden, 254 N.E.2d 199, 202 (Ind. 1970) (describing how Levy 
involved non-marital children who brought action for the wrongful death of their 
mother, while Glona involved a mother bringing action for the wrongful death of her 
son). 
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suing for the wrongful death of her nonmarital child.196  As in Levy, the 
Court found the prohibition irrational, remarking: “It would, indeed, be 
farfetched to assume that women have illegitimate children so they can be 
compensated in damages for their death.”197  Oddly, many courts 
discussing Glona have described it as a decision striking down an 
illegitimacy classification.198  But because the nonmarital child in the case 
had died, the classification was not based on illegitimacy but on the 
plaintiff’s marital status at the time of her child’s birth.199  Such 
classifications do not receive the heightened scrutiny that illegitimacy 
classifications do and might have no difficulty surviving rational basis 
review, the most limited scope of review.200  Still, although the rational 
basis standard is highly deferential, “[t]he Equal Protection Clause 
prohibits ‘arbitrary and irrational discrimination’ even if no suspect class or 
                                                          
 196. Glona, 391 U.S. at 76 (holding that when a state withholds relief to a mother 
because her child was born out-of-wedlock, it denies equal protection under the law). 
 197. Id. at 75; cf. Hughes v. Parham, 243 S.E.2d 867, 871 (Ga. 1978) (Hill, J., 
dissenting) (“The denial of a claim for a child’s wrongful death does not promote the 
family as an institution for rearing that child in a timely or rational manner regardless 
of the level of scrutiny employed.”), aff’d, 441 U.S. 347, 353 (1979) (“It is thus neither 
illogical nor unjust for society to express its ‘condemnation of irresponsible liaisons 
beyond the bonds of marriage’ by not conferring upon a biological father the statutory 
right to sue for the wrongful death of his illegitimate child.”). 
 198. See, e.g., Alexander v. Whitman, 114 F.3d 1392, 1404 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(classifying Glona as a case addressing a legislative classification based on “having 
been born out of wedlock”); Jerry Vogel Music Co. v. Edward B. Marks Music Corp., 
425 F.2d 834, 836 (2d Cir. 1969) (“In Levy and Glona the Court had no problem of 
defeating reasonable expectations that any party had entertained in the past.  It held 
merely that the illegitimacy of the plaintiff or the decedent was not a constitutionally 
adequate defense to a wrongful death action.”); Peterson v. Norton, 395 F. Supp. 1351, 
1355 (D. Conn. 1975) (grouping Glona with other Supreme Court decisions involving 
“classifications on the basis of legitimacy of birth”); Poulos v. McMahan, 297 S.E.2d 
451, 452 (Ga. 1982) (characterizing Glona as “present[ing] with the issue of whether a 
statutory discrimination against illegitimate children is constitutional”); Burnett v. 
Camden, 254 N.E.2d 199, 202 (Ind. 1970) (describing the classification in Glona by 
“the fact that the child was born out-of-wedlock”). 
 199. See Parham, 441 U.S. at 355 n.7 (“The invidious discrimination perceived in 
[Glona] was between married and unmarried mothers.”). 
 200. See FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993) (explaining that 
rational basis review defers to legislative judgment and demands no evidence or 
empirical data in support of legislation); Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 15 (1992) 
(explaining that rational basis review merely requires that a “purpose may conceivably 
or may reasonably have been the purpose and policy” of the legislature (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); Williams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d 944, 948 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(“Only in an exceptional circumstance will a statute not be rationally related to a 
legitimate government interest and be found unconstitutional under rational basis 
scrutiny.”); Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court 
from the 1971 Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357, 357 (1999) 
(characterizing rational basis review as “extremely deferential”).  Challenges based on 
rational basis rarely succeed.  Farrell, supra, at 357 (“In the past twenty-five years, the 
Court has decided ten such cases, while during the same time period, it has rejected 
rational basis arguments on one hundred occasions.”). 
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fundamental right is implicated.”201  Accordingly, it is conceivable that the 
Court would disapprove of a statute that establishes marriage as a proxy for 
the support of marital children and that requires the unmarried to make an 
independent showing of support for their children.202  Marriage is, after all, 
no guarantee that parents will support their children.  Even if an unwed 
father took steps to legitimate his child, his failure to support his child 
would have to be addressed by invoking the state’s enforcement machinery.  
The same is true of married fathers who fail to support their legitimate 
children.  Denying one set of parents’ inheritance rights for non-support of 
their children but not similarly depriving married parents who do not 
support their children stigmatizes the unmarried and runs counter to a broad 
reading of Eisenstadt and other Supreme Court decisions.203  By failing to 
recognize the Georgia statute’s marital status discrimination in Rainey, the 
Georgia Supreme Court implied that the Georgia legislature could cure the 
equal protection flaw in the statute by imposing the same deprivation of 
inheritance rights on women who bear children out of wedlock as was 
imposed on men.  By not granting certiorari in Rainey, the United States 
Supreme Court left several indistinguishable statutes in other states 
untouched.  In so doing, the Court resurrected its former justification for 
not striking down statutes stigmatizing illegitimate children and thereby 
                                                          
 201. Muller v. Costello, 187 F.3d 298, 309 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985) 
(“The State may not rely on a classification whose relationship to an asserted goal is so 
attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational.”). 
 202. See Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 552-53 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(“It is also important not to obscure the fact that the formality of marriage primarily 
signifies a relationship between husband and wife, not between parent and child.  
Analysis of the rationality of any state effort to impose obligations based upon the fact 
of marriage must, therefore, distinguish between those obligations that run between 
parties to the marriage and those that run to others.”); JANET L. DOLGIN, DEFINING THE 
FAMILY: LAW, TECHNOLOGY, AND REPRODUCTION IN AN UNEASY AGE 99, 117 (1997) 
(suggesting the Court’s position in unwed father cases is driven less by the concern that 
fathers establish relationships with their children than that they establish a connection 
to the mothers of their children); Linda C. McClain, “Irresponsible” Reproduction,  47 
HASTINGS L.J. 339, 342 (1996) (“Although reproduction within marriage serves as the 
best proxy for responsible reproduction in this discourse, and nonmarital reproduction 
for irresponsible reproduction, such models prove to be both over- and 
underinclusive.”). 
   The Supreme Court has declined to analyze such claims.  See, e.g., Michael H. v. 
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 116-17 (1989) (“We do not reach Michael’s equal protection 
claim, however, as it was neither raised nor passed upon below.”); Caban v. 
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 n.16 (1979) (declining to address an equal protection 
claim founded on differential treatment of married and unmarried fathers).  But see 
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978) (finding compelling distinctions between 
unmarried and married fathers based on the latter’s having “borne full responsibility for 
the rearing of [their] children during the period of the marriage”). 
 203. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (citing the illegitimacy 
classification case, Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968) (“[T]he law [has not] 
refused to recognize those family relationships unlegitimized by a marriage 
ceremony.”)). 
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perpetuated the law’s continued promotion of marital families. 
It has been a long road to legislative reforms aimed at advancing the 
contemporary view that there are no illegitimate children, only illegitimate 
parents, and erasing the stigma surrounding illegitimacy of birth.  
Nonetheless, when illegitimacy as a status fell into disfavor, the result was 
not to strike down laws criminalizing sexual activity between consenting 
adults but roughly to equalize the treatment of non-marital and marital 
children.  As a quasi-suspect classification qualifying only for intermediate 
scrutiny, children born out of wedlock are still subject to differential 
treatment that significantly advances the state’s interest in the orderly 
administration of estates. 
The long history of the legal treatment of nonmarital children reveals not 
only opprobrium aimed at the behavior of their parents but also, at the very 
least, some measure of hatred and suspicion toward the children 
themselves.  By some accounts, they are interlopers, subhuman, unworthy 
of civil status, and even loathed by their own parents.  There is no question 
that nonmarital children have suffered stigma by virtue of the lawless 
circumstances of their birth.  Indeed, illegitimacy classifications themselves 
and the codification of differential treatment based on them have inspired 
some states to declare nonmarital children a suspect class.204  At the very 
least, the courts have recognized that discrimination against nonmarital 
children is not merely regrettable but is in fact invidious. 
II.  ASSISTED REPRODUCTION AND ILLEGITIMACY 
A. Biblical Roots 
Illegitimacy as a status is rooted in an ancient story of assisted 
reproduction.  The biblical story of Abraham, Sarah, and their servant 
Hagar is essentially the story of an infertile woman who wanted children 
and invoked the custom of permitting her husband to have children by his 
slave.  Abraham impregnated Hagar, who later gave birth to Ishmael.  All 
was well until Sarah unexpectedly became pregnant and gave birth to Isaac.  
Her fortunes having turned in a new direction, Sarah prevailed upon 
Abraham to banish Hagar and Ishmael, who wandered in the desert until 
they were near death.  In this story and other passages of the Bible, 
“Christian theologians and jurists alike found . . . ample sanction for the 
legal doctrine of illegitimacy.”205 
                                                          
 204. See generally Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (noting that Texas had a 
law separating illegitimate children from legitimate children into a class, which denied 
right of parental support). 
 205. WITTE, supra note 3, at 4.  Although his birth resulted from a custom of the 
Jewish people, the later Christian church described Ishmael as a spurious illegitimate.  
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The story of Abraham, Sarah, and Hagar, read in modern terms, has a 
number of ugly associations that taint our notion of what surrogacy could 
be.  First, it associates surrogates with poor, enslaved women, forced to 
bear children for others and then discarded.  Such visions stoke the 
concerns about exploitation that have been so prominent in debates about 
the ethics of surrogacy206 and resound in news headlines about the darkest 
manifestation of surrogacy: human trafficking.207  Second, it supports the 
stereotypical idea of “greedy” commissioning parents who are incapable of 
full devotion to children not genetically related to themselves.  Sarah 
manifests perhaps the worst of this quality, rejecting the child she had 
intended to rear once the opportunity for genetic parenthood presented 
itself.  In short, the biblical surrogacy story is about one-dimensional 
women toiling in the shadow of patriarchy, either powerless and exploited 
or demanding and opportunistic.  A worse template for surrogacy could 
scarcely be imagined.  The repugnance we bear toward the slavery, 
oppression of women, child abuse, betrayal, opportunism, and narcissism is 
undoubtedly the emotional fuel behind certain calls to reject  surrogacy as a 
means of  becoming parents. 
B. Contemporary Manifestations 
Nothing about the biblical surrogacy story resembles modern day 
surrogacy arrangements.  Nonetheless, assisted reproduction has been 
associated with adultery and illegitimacy since its inception.  This 
association is most salient in cases of alternative insemination by donor and 
surrogacy.   
1. Alternative Insemination by Donor 
Although there are reports of alternative insemination being conducted 
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, alternative insemination 
began to be more widely used during the 1950s, when, during the Korean 
War, soldiers banked their sperm for later use by their wives.208  Artificial 
                                                          
Id. at 68.  The early church, by contrast, presented the story as an allegory instead of  a 
story about illicit sex.  See id. at 40-42. 
 206. See generally Stephen Wilkinson, The Exploitation Argument Against 
Commercial Surrogacy, 17 BIOETHICS 169 (2003) (exploring the basis for arguments 
that commercial surrogacy is exploitative and raising the question of whether 
commercial surrogacy should be prohibited even if it is determined not to be 
exploitative). 
 207. See Michael Cook, Surrogate Baby Ring Busted in Bangkok, BIOEDGE (Feb. 
25, 2011, 11:16 PM), http://www.bioedge.org/index.php/bioethics/ 
bioethics_article/9413/ (describing a commercial surrogacy company whose practices 
included restricting the movement of surrogate mothers and confiscating their 
passports). 
 208. MARICRUZ DE LA TORRE VARGAS, LA FECUNDACIÓN IN VITRO Y LA FILIACIÓN 
12 (1993). 
28
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol20/iss3/8
  
2012] PHANTOM CHILDREN OF THE REPUBLIC 589 
insemination by donor became more familiar in the 1960s.209  By the mid-
1970s, judicial decisions and, later, legislation210 began to appear regarding 
the legality of, the legal requirements for (regulation of practices and 
access: payment, anonymity, administration by physician or in hospital)211 
or the legal consequences (filiation,212 illegitimacy,213 grounds for 
divorce,214 and insurance215) of what we now call alternative insemination 
                                                          
 209. Charles Kindregan, Jr., Thinking about the Law of Assisted Reproductive 
Technology, 27 WIS. J. FAM. L. 123, 123 (2007), available at 
http://www.wisbar.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Family_Law_Section&TEMPLAT
E=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=75102. 
 210. 10 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 181 (1983).  There was some case law prior to 
1968.  See, e.g., Anonymous v. Anonymous, 246 N.Y.S.2d 835, 836 (Sup. Ct. 1964) 
(citing Gursky v. Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963),  People ex rel. Abajian v. 
Dennett, 184 N.Y.S.2d 178 (Sup. Ct. 1958), and Strnad v. Strnad, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 
(Sup. Ct.  1948)) (holding husband liable for support for children born via artificial 
insemination where husband consented in writing to the  insemination of his wife with 
the sperm of a donor); see also G. D. Walker, Legitimacy and Paternity, 14 ARK. L. 
REV. 55, 58 (1960). 
 211. 1977 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 53 (1977) (Yugoslavia, among other 
provisions, barring payment to sperm donors), 1978 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 12; 9 
ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 155-56 (1982) (comprehensive regulations promulgated in 
Czechoslovakia); 9 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 157-58 (1982) (Hungary Ministry of 
Health ordinance and obstetrics, gynaecology and urology societies’ circular governing 
“the selection and examination of donors and recipients for artificial insemination”). 
 212. See 10 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 175-76 (1983) (German court determined 
that time had expired beyond which husband could contest paternity of child born by 
AID to which husband consented); 9 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 154-55 (1982) 
(Czechoslovakia); 1980 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 168 (Yugoslavia); 1976 ANN. REV. 
POPULATION L. 105-06 (French court ruled husband could renounce his paternity even 
if he had consented to his wife’s medical insemination by donor); M. Mandofia & M. 
Buergisser, Les difficultés de réglementer la procréation assistée, 13 DÉVIANCE ET 
SOCIÉTÉ 257, 258 (1989) (Switz.).  Such laws coincided with the enactment of similar 
laws in the individual U.S states and the Canadian provinces.  9 ANN. REV. 
POPULATION L. 95 (Québec); 1976 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 114-116 (Connecticut). 
 213. See Gursky v. Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406, 410-11 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (noting that a 
child born through heterologous artificial insemination by a third party donor is not 
considered born in wedlock and is therefore illegitimate); L. v. L., 1 All. E.R. 141 
(1949) (Eng.) (holding in an annulment action that the child of a married couple was 
illegitimate because although the wife became pregnant by intrauterine insemination, 
the marriage was not consummated); 9 ANN. REP. POPULATION L. 152 (1982) (South 
African court determines child born via artificial insemination to be illegitimate); Kelly 
L. Frey, Comment, New Reproductive Technologies: The Legal Problem and a 
Solution, 49 TENN. L. REV. 303, 313-17 (1982) (discussing Doornbos v. Doornbos 
where the court held that “AID, even with the consent of the husband, is an act of 
adultery and that the offspring of AID are illegitimate” (citation omitted)); M.L. 
Lupton, Status of Children Born by Artificial Insemination in South African Law, 1985 
J. S. AFR. L. 277, 279 (1985) (“[T]he father of an AID or IVF . . . child who had treated 
the child as his own for years and who had given his consent to its conception could 
assert his non-paternity as a defence to a claim for maintenance.”). 
 214. See Orford v. Orford (1921), 58 D.L.R. 251-52 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct.) 
(considering artificial insemination without the husband’s permission to be adultery); 
K. Stoyanovitch, La légitimité des enfants nés par suite de l’insemination artificielle en 
France et aux Etats-Unis d’Amerique, 8 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARE 
264, 267-68, 270-71 (1956) (Fr.). 
 215. See 10 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 176-77 (1983) (Germany); 8 ANN. REV. 
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but what was then widely known as artificial insemination.  By the late 
1980s we can discern a full-fledged academic discussion about the law and 
ethics of assisted reproduction. 
Alternative insemination (AI) by donor inspired restrictive rules in 
several countries around the world.  Czechoslovakia permitted AI only for 
“health reasons” such as male-factor infertility, defects of the female 
organs, risk of hereditary disease, or “evolutionary defects”216 and barred 
women over thirty-five years of age from access to the technology.217  The 
couple had to submit an application and pay a fee.  Donors of semen could 
not be older than forty, and anonymity was strictly required.218  Hungary 
required donors not only to undergo a test for hereditary disease but also a 
psychological examination.219 
Significant attention was paid during this early period to whether 
children born via alternative insemination by donor (AID) would be 
legitimate, even if born to a married woman.220  In part, the issue involved 
the “paradox” of an AID child’s being born to the marriage but not being 
the product of adultery.221  But courts have reached widely varying decision 
on both the question of adultery and of illegitimacy.  At least two courts 
sidestepped the paradox by declaring AID to be adultery that causes the 
resulting child to be illegitimate.222  The Orford court, on this account, 
reasoned that an adulterous act does not consist of sexual penetration in 
such cases but lies in “the invasion of the reproductive function.”223  The 
court, however, suggested that illegitimacy would only follow if the AID 
had occurred without the husband’s consent.224  A New York court 
declared flatly that AID children are illegitimate, disapproving as 
“supported by no legal precedent” an earlier case that had declared an AID 
child legitimate.225  The court did not specify whether AID amounted to 
                                                          
POPULATION L. 188 (1981) (France). 
 216. 9 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 155 (1982). 
 217. Id. at 156. 
 218. Id. 
 219. 9 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 158 (1982). 
 220. See, e.g., Artificial Insemination and Illegitimacy, 112 JAMA 1832, 1832 
(1939); Sidney B. Schatkin, Artificial Insemination and Illegitimacy, 11 HUMAN 
FERTILITY 14 (1946); Stoyanovitch, supra note 214, at 267. 
 221. Schatkin, supra note 220, at 14. 
 222. Orford v. Orford (1921), 58 D.L.R. 251-52 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct.); Gursky v. 
Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406, 410-11 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (citing Doornbos). 
 223. Schatkin, supra note 220, at 15 (quoting Orford).  This reasoning was also 
adopted in Russell v. Russell, [1924] A.C. 687, 721. 
 224. Schatkin, supra note 220, at 15. 
 225. Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 411 (referring to Strnad v. Strnad, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 
(Sup. Ct. 1948)).  In an earlier case, the plaintiff, already divorced, was estopped from 
claiming for the first time that her children were the result of AID in support of her 
request that her ex-husband be denied custody and visitation.  People ex rel. Abajian v. 
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adultery, but instead reasoned that an AID child is “begotten by a father 
other than the husband of the mother” and is therefore illegitimate.226  
Decisions of a similar nature were handed down in South Africa and 
Germany, the South African court holding “with regret” that the child was 
illegitimate despite the consent of the husband to the insemination of his 
wife with donor sperm and despite the  procedure’s not amounting to  
adultery.227  The German court decided that a husband may challenge the 
legitimacy of a child born of AID to which he consented.228  Under Jewish 
law, the importance of biological parentage caused judges to consider 
illegitimate “the offspring of a married woman, born to her from another 
man’s sperm.”229  But since illegitimacy is a badge of shame that emanates 
essentially from adultery proscriptions,230 some judges had trouble equating 
AID with illegitimacy,231 although they nonetheless considered the sperm 
donor to be the child’s father.232  Contrariwise, the question of legitimacy 
does not arise if a single women gives birth to a child via AID.233  The 
strong association between AI and legitimacy inspired the court in Zepeda 
v. Zepeda to query whether artificial insemination might give rise in some 
future cases to claims of wrongful life.234 
Today, when illegitimacy is barely cognizable as a legal category,235 
under all statutes that define the paternity ramifications of artificial 
insemination by donor, the husband of an artificially inseminated woman is 
                                                          
Dennett, 184 N.Y.S.2d 178, 182 (Sup. Ct. 1958). 
 226. Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 410. 
 227. 9 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 159 (1982).  This approach is similar to that taken 
in Artificial Insemination and Illegitimacy, supra note 220. 
 228. 10 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 176 (1983). 
 229. Noam Zohar, Artificial Insemination and Surrogate Motherhood: A Halakhic 
Perspective, 2 S’VARA: J. PHIL. & JUDAISM 13, 14 (1991). 
 230. See id. at 15. 
 231. See id. at 16. 
 232. See id. 
 233. See generally SUSAN MARTHA KAHN, REPRODUCING JEWS: A CULTURAL 
ACCOUNT OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION IN ISRAEL 64, 71 (Arjun Appadurai et al. eds., 
2000) (discussing the support of AID, the recognition of its legitimacy, and its impact 
within society). 
 234. 190 N.E.2d 849, 859 (Ill. App. Ct. 1963) (“If there are public sperm banks in 
future years and if there are sperm injections like present day blood transfusions, with 
donors and donees unknown to each other, will there not be a basis for an action for 
wrongful life? . . . If such awesome experiments are successfully pursued and their 
ultimate goal , the abiogenesis of human life achieved, would a being so created have a 
cause of action for wrongful life against those whose knowledge and skill were so 
employed?”). 
 235. By this statement, I do not mean to minimize the discrimination and harm that 
still accrues under law and regulations of questionable constitutionality.  See generally 
Maldonado, supra note 29, at 360 (cataloging continuing harms against children born 
out of wedlock). 
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the father of the resulting child if he consented to the insemination.236  
Public policy favoring legitimacy and support for children creates a strong 
presumption that a husband consented to his wife’s insemination.237  The 
typical method of demonstrating consent is through a signed writing,238 but 
consent can also be established orally.239  Where a husband gives no written 
or oral consent, even in states with no governing statute, he may 
nonetheless be liable for support under contract theories or equitable 
principles.240  Other cases do not reach a final determination of these issues 
                                                          
 236. See ALA. CODE § 26-17-703 (2012); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (2012); ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 9-10-201(a) (2012); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(a) (West 2012); COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 19-4-106(1) (2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-774 (West 2012); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 742.11(1) (West 2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-21 (2012); IDAHO CODE 
ANN. § 39-5405(3) (2012); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/2 (West 2012); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 23-129 (West 2012); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-206 (West 2012); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 46, § 4B (2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.2824(6) (West 
2012); MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.824(1) (West 2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106(1) 
(West, Westlaw through 2012); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1412.01 (LexisNexis 
2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:3(II) (2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44(a) 
(West 2012); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73(1) (McKinney 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-
1 (2012); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 3111.95(A) (LEXISNEXIS 2012); OKLA. STAT. tit. 
10, § 552 (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-
158(A)(2) (2012); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.40(1) (West 2012); In re Adoption of Reams, 
557 N.E.2d 159, 163 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (conclusive presumption of paternity).  But 
see Welborn v. Doe, 394 S.E.2d 732, 733 (Va. Ct. App. 1990) (statute merely created 
presumption of husband’s paternity; adoption was a more certain way of establishing 
paternity). 
 237. See K.S. v. G.S., 440 A.2d 64, 65, 68 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1981); see also 
Brooks v. Fair, 532 N.E.2d 208, 212-13 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (same policies militate 
against wife’s disavowal of her husband’s paternity). 
 238. See In re Marriage of Witbeck-Wildhagen, 667 N.E.2d 122, 125 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1996) (written consent is mandatory); K.S., 440 A.2d at 68 (noting that many other 
states’ statutes require written consent); Lane v. Lane, 912 P.2d 290, 296 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 1996) (there was substantial compliance with writing requirement through 
pleadings in divorce proceeding); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 1991 WL 57753, at *6, 
*10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1991) (recognizing insufficient compliance with writing 
requirement and thus no grounds for imposition of equitable estoppel); Anonymous v. 
Anonymous, 246 N.Y.S.2d 835, 837 (Sup. Ct. 1964) (establishing support obligation 
on implied contract theory); Gursky v. Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406, 412 (Sup. Ct. 1963) 
(same). 
 239. See R.S. v. R.S., 670 P.2d 923, 927-28 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983) (oral consent 
created estoppel to deny paternity); K.S., 440 A.2d at 65 (verbal consent).  But see K.B. 
v. N.B., 811 S.W.2d 634, 638 (Tex. App. 1991) (oral consent insufficient). 
 240. See People v. Sorenson, 437 P.2d 495, 499 (Cal. 1968); In re Marriage of 
Adams, 551 N.E.2d 635, 638 (Ill. 1990) (writing requirement might not be so strict as 
to preclude finding of parent-child relationship or support obligation on other grounds); 
Levin v. Levin, 645 N.E.2d 601, 604-605 (Ind. 1994) (estoppel to deny support 
obligation when consented orally and in writing, where the state had no artificial 
insemination statute); In re Baby Doe, 353 S.E.2d 877, 879 (S.C. 1987) (consent 
implied from conduct establishes paternity); K.B., 811 S.W.2d at 639 (full knowledge 
and willing participation constituted ratification of parent-child relationship); L.M.S. v. 
S.L.S., 312 N.W.2d 853, 855 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981) (adopting moral obligation theory); 
cf. Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 288 (Ct. App. 1998) (estoppel 
precluded denial of support obligation to child resulting from consent to gestational 
surrogacy); Karin T. v. Michael T., 484 N.Y.S.2d 780, 784 (Fam. Ct. 1985) (“The 
contract and the equitable estoppel which prevail in this case prevent the respondent 
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on procedural grounds.241 
2. Surrogacy and the Cult of Gestational Motherhood 
In addition to the association of alternative insemination with 
illegitimacy, , many countries view surrogacy with such suspicion that it is 
thought to give rise to illegitimate forms of the family.  In part, this 
approach to surrogacy arises from the intractable view of the legal 
implications of gestational motherhood.  “[I]n traditional European-
American thinking a mother’s identity is understood as [an unwavering] 
natural fact:”242 “birth itself is conclusive proof of motherhood.”243  In both 
the civil law and the common law, this tradition is embodied in the maxim 
“mater semper certa est, etiamsi vulgo conceperit, pater est quem nuptiae 
demonstrant,” or “maternity is always certain even of illegitimate children, 
paternity follows marriage,”244 which continues to carry considerable 
weight, having been enshrined in the Brussels Convention on the 
Establishment of Maternal Affiliation of Natural Children (1962) and the 
Convention on the Legal Status of Children Born out of Wedlock (1975).245  
                                                          
from asserting her lack of responsibility by reason of lack of parenthood.”).  But see 
Shin v. Kong, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 304, 305 (Ct. App. 2000) (where consent was not 
obtained for the procedure, husband could not have parental liability imposed upon him 
even via equity). 
    Such principles may also estop a wife from denying the paternity of her husband, 
see, e.g., State ex rel. H. v. P., 457 N.Y.S.2d 488, 492 (App. Div. 1982); In re Adoption 
of Anonymous, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430, 435-36 (Sup. Ct. 1973); People ex rel. Abajian v. 
Dennett, 184 N.Y.S.2d 178, 182 (Sup. Ct. 1958) (wife’s conduct estopped her from 
denying ex-husband’s paternal rights); Brooks, 532 N.E.2d at 212-13, a surrogate from 
raising the artificial insemination statute to negate the claim of the intending father, see, 
e.g., In re Matthew B., 284 Cal. Rptr. 18, 34 (Ct. App. 1991) (surrogate stipulated to 
the paternity of the intending father); cf. R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790, 795-96 (Mass. 
1998) (stating artificial insemination statute is inapplicable to surrogacy arrangements), 
or even a known donor from asserting paternity, see Leckie v. Voorhies, 875 P.2d 521, 
522 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (donor’s signed agreement not to assert paternity constituted 
effective contractual waiver). 
 241. See, e.g., Alexandria S. v. Pac. Fertility Med. Ctr., Inc., 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 23, 33 
(Ct. App. 1997) (failure to appeal issue); Hill v. Hulet, 881 P.2d 460, 461-62 (Colo. 
App. 1994) (collateral estoppel); Kerns v. Schmidt, 641 N.E.2d 280, 284 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1994) (failure to raise issue in lower court). 
 242. DOLGIN, supra note 202, at 119-20. 
 243. Mary Ann B. Oakley, Test Tube Babies: Proposals for Legal Regulation of 
New Methods of Human Conception and Prenatal Development, 8 FAM. L.Q. 385, 391 
(1974). 
 244. JOHN GEORGE PHILLIMORE, PRIVATE LAW AMONG THE ROMANS FROM THE 
PANDECTS 64 (1863); M.T. Meulders-Klein, Cohabitation and Children in Europe, 29 
AM. J. COMP. L. 359, 376 (1981) (citing the Germanic and Scandinavian countries 
which have traditionally “given preponderance to the unmarried mother’s name, mainly 
because maternity was always established in application of the Mater simper certa est 
rule . . .”). 
 245. European Court of Human Rights: Judgment in the Marckx Case (Status of 
Children Born out-of-wedlock; Inheritance Rights), 19 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 109, 
114 (1980) [hereinafter Judgment in the Marckx Case] (basing both the Brussels 
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A Belgian newspaper explains: “The principle is simple: a child’s legal 
mother is she who gives birth to it.  Belgian law is extremely clear on this 
subject.”246  Not only is the law perfectly clear, there simply is no legal way 
to “break the lines of filiation.”247  This maxim holds even in the United 
Kingdom, where altruistic surrogacy is legal,248 but not in Greece, where 
the law recognizes the intending mother in surrogacy arrangements as the 
legal mother.249  Most countries in Europe reject surrogacy, however, so 
that in this area of assisted reproduction at least, the medical technologies 
of vitro fertilization and embryo transfer have not successfully eroded the 
force of the maxim.250 
Mater semper certa est is not the only reason for rejecting surrogacy, 
because of course adoption could be employed to transfer motherhood in 
such cases.  Also salient are expressions of worry about exploitation and 
the best interests of the child.    In contrast to the United States, where such 
concerns have largely been employed to call for greater protection for the 
surrogate who changes her mind and to develop approaches to surrogacy 
                                                          
Convention of 12 September 1962 and the Convention of 15 October 1975 on the 
Legal Status of Children born out of wedlock on the principle “mater simper certa est” 
and in the latter convention, regulating maintenance obligations, parental authority, and 
rights of succession). 
 246. Une vingtaine de cas connus, LA DERNIÈRE HEURE, May 24, 2005 (Belg.), 
available at http://www.dhnet.be/dhjournal/archives_det.phtml?id=479992. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 § 33 (Eng.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2008/22/section/33.  Note also the adherence to 
the maxim in the South African law of surrogacy.  See Lize Mills, Certainty about 
Surrogacy, 21 STELLENBOSCH L. REV. 429, 432 (2010) (S. Afr.).  The statutory 
regulation of surrogacy allows the commissioning couple to be recognized as the 
parents of the child if the surrogate does not seek to terminate the agreement within 
sixty days of the birth of the child.  Id. at 435-36. 
 249. Ismini Kriari-Catranis, Human Assisted Procreation and Human Rights—The 
Greek Response to the Felt Necessities of the Time, 10 EUR. J. HEALTH L. 271, 276 
(2003) (Neth.) (presuming that the mother of the child is the woman who obtained 
court permission under the conditions of Article 1458 CC). 
 250. Note that the maxim appears not to be recognized in France.  Jacqueline 
Rubellin-Devichi, The Reform Wagon Rolls Again, 25 J. FAM. L. 127, 134 (1986) 
(noting that even if one fails to acknowledge their child, possession d’etat will be 
established through proof of treating a child as one’s own).  Italy, however, abolished 
its rule requiring the birth mother to establish maternity by recognizing her child in 
favor of embracing the maxim.  Hélène Bauer-Bernet, Effect of Information Science on 
the Formation and Drafting of Law, 14 JURIMETRICS J. 236 (1974).  Belgium was 
forced to do likewise in the case of Marckx.  Judgment in the Marckx Case, supra note 
245, at 121 (“[We] cannot but be struck by the fact that the domestic law of the great 
majority of the member States of the Council of Europe has evolved and continuing to 
evolve, in company with the relevant international instruments, towards full juridical 
recognition of the maxim . . . .”).  The laws of all three countries were influenced by 
the French Civil Code requiring voluntary acknowledgment by a mother of her child 
born out-of-wedlock.  Meulders-Klein, supra note 244, at 363-64  (requiring special 
formalities such as voluntary acknowledgment or judicial order to ascertain a mother-
child relationship and finding that such a relationship might not be established even if 
both parties are living together). 
34
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol20/iss3/8
  
2012] PHANTOM CHILDREN OF THE REPUBLIC 595 
that appropriately lessen that risk, in Europe, the concern has been that a 
woman should never be a surrogate to begin with.  This may ostensibly be 
because of concerns about exploitation or a desire for legal certainty but 
may more directly be traceable to an immovable sense of the proper role of 
gestational mothers.  In contrast to the United States, where courts have 
been willing to “negate absolutely, or minimize seriously, the significance 
of the biological bases of a surrogate’s claims to legal maternity,”251 in 
Europe the force of gestational motherhood makes it impervious to such 
legal maneuvering.  As Janet Dolgin has observed: 
The contractualization of maternity represented by surrogacy 
arrangements provides an especially stark, and therefore especially 
troubling, instance of the erosion of romantic images of woman and 
mother first constructed at the start of the Industrial Revolution.  That 
women may negotiate the conditions of their biological maternity before 
becoming pregnant, and that they may further choose to undertake 
biological maternity without desiring or presuming that social maternity 
will follow, completely disrupts traditional understandings of 
motherhood.252 
Whether because of fears of exploitation, a desire for legal certainty, or 
an intractable ideology of gestational motherhood, European countries have 
been unwilling to disrupt those traditional understandings.  Their response 
to citizens who go abroad for surrogacy and bring children home 
documents that the new illegitimacy may not simply arise out of marriage 
bias but through bias against the way a child comes into being.  Surrogacy 
is the culprit here, and in Europe, where surrogacy is widely banned, is 
giving rise to a new illegitimacy that neither international law nor human 
rights may be able to curb. 
III.  THE NEW ILLEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
SURROGACY 
Cross-border reproductive travel has become a more and more common 
response to the restrictive laws and high prices that individuals and couples 
encounter when they consider assisted reproduction.253  The law of assisted 
                                                          
 251. DOLGIN, supra note 202, at 122. 
 252. Id. at 120; see also Pedro F. Silva-Ruiz, La Inseminacíon Artificial. 
Reproducción Asexual. Implicaciones Jurídicas de las Nuevas Tecnologías de 
Reproducción Humana, 32 REV. DER. P.R. 45, 50-52 (1992) (raising ethical concerns 
about surrogacy and finding that certain religions view surrogacy as an offense to the 
dignity and right of the child through conception). 
 253. Richard F. Storrow, Assisted Reproduction on Treacherous Terrain: The Legal 
Hazards of Cross-border Reproductive Travel, 23 REPROD. BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 538 
(2011); Storrow, Pluralism Problem, supra note 80, at 2940-41; Richard F. Storrow, 
Quests for Conception: Fertility Tourists, Globalization and Feminist Legal Theory, 57 
HASTINGS L.J. 295, 298 (2005) (positing that reproductive travel arises from “the 
interplay between member states’ individual (some would say idiosyncratic) policies on 
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reproduction interacts with the growing phenomenon of cross-border 
reproductive travel in four significant ways.  First, legal restrictions on 
assisted reproductive procedures or limitations on access to them by certain 
classes of individuals may trigger travel abroad for assisted reproductive 
services.  Such laws may also inspire physicians to travel abroad to provide 
services outlawed at home or to refer patients to clinics in more permissive 
countries.  Examples of legal restrictions that may trigger cross-border 
movements or referrals are Germany’s ban on in vitro fertilization (IVF) 
with egg donation;254 Italy’s, Turkey’s, and most Muslim countries’ ban on 
any use of third-party gametes;255 France’s exclusion of non-heterosexual 
couples from infertility treatment;256 Australia’s ban on non-medical sex 
selection;257 the ban on surrogacy in many countries;258 and the 
Netherlands’ and the United Kingdom’s ban on anonymous gamete 
donation.259  Some of these legal regimes may also prohibit making 
                                                          
responsible procreation and globalist policy of free movement of persons); Richard F. 
Storrow, Travel into the Future of Reproductive Technology, 79 UMKC L. REV. 295, 
299 (2010) (stating a desire to acquire treatment not offered in the jurisdiction makes 
opportunities in permissive or laissez faire jurisdictions more appealing, causing 
individuals to seek reproductive assistance in these locations). 
 254. Sven Bergmann, Reproductive Agency and Projects: Germans Searching for 
Egg Donation in Spain and the Czech Republic, 23 REPROD. BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 600 
(2011). 
 255. Marcia C. Inhorn, ‘Assisted’ Motherhood in Global Dubai: Reproductive 
Tourists and Their Helpers, in THE GLOBALIZATION OF MOTHERHOOD: 
DECONSTRUCTIONS AND RECONSTRUCTIONS OF BIOLOGY AND CARE 180, 190-96 
(JaneMaree Maher & Wendy Chavkin eds., 2010) (discussing seven discrete but not 
unrelated factors which promote reproductive tourism); MARCIA C. INHORN, LOCAL 
BABIES, GLOBAL SCIENCE: GENDER, RELIGION, AND IN VITRO FERTILIZATION IN EGYPT 
86 (2003); Zeynep Gürtin-Broadbent, Banning Reproductive Travel? Turkey’s Assisted 
Reoroduction Legislation and Third Party Assisted Reproduction, 23 REPRO. 
BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 555 (2011); Marcia C. Inhorn, Diasporic Dreaming: Return 
Reproductive Tourism to the Middle East, 23 REPROD. BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 582, 588-
89 (2011); Marcia C. Inhorn, Global Infertility and the Globalization of New 
Reproductive Technologies: Illustrations from Egypt, 56 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1837, 1847 
(2003) (discussing how despite religious and cultural restrictions on donor 
insemination, new high tech reproductive technologies are rapidly globalizing even to 
developing countries); Marcia C. Inhorn & Pankaj Shrivastav, Globalization and 
Reproductive Tourism in the United Arab Emirates, 22 ASIA-PAC. J. PUB. HEALTH 694, 
695 (2010) (studying how local cultural ideologies and practices not found in Western 
countries reshape the use of new reproductive technologies in Egypt and how these 
technologies are being adapted); Giulia Zanini, Abandoned by the State, Betrayed by 
the Church: Italian Experiences of Cross-Border Reproductive Care, 23 REPROD. 
BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 565 (2011). 
 256. Petra De Sutter, Considerations for Clinics and Practitioners Treating Foreign 
Patients: Lessons from Experiences in Belgium, 23 REPROD. BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 652 
(2011). 
 257. Andrea Whittaker, Reproductive Opportunists in the New Global Sex Trade: 
PGD and Non-medical Sex Selection, 23 REPROD. BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 609 (2011). 
 258. Amrita Pande, Transnational Commercial Surrogacy in India: Gifts for Global 
Sisters?, 23 REPROD. BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 618 (2011). 
 259. De Sutter, supra note 256; Nicky Hudson & Lorraine Culley, Reproductive 
Tourists? UK Trajectories, 23 REPROD. BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 573 (2011). 
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referrals to clinics in countries where the procedures sought are legal260  or 
even mentioning prohibited techniques to patients.261  In some countries, 
going abroad and receiving treatment where it is legal is itself a criminal 
offense.  Turkey now explicitly prohibits travelling abroad to procure donor 
gametes.262  Malaysia and the three Australian jurisdictions prohibit 
international commercial surrogacy.263 
Among the reproduction assisting procedures that patients travel abroad 
to procure, surrogacy, heavily restricted or outlawed by many countries 
around the world, poses special legal problems owing to its peculiar factual 
context.  Most European countries and some countries in Asia ban 
surrogacy.  In response to these laws, individuals affected by these laws 
now travel to countries like the United States, Ukraine, and India, where 
surrogacy is permitted.264  The children born of international surrogacy tend 
to be born in the host country,265 and the intending parents must obtain 
travel documents to return with their new children to their countries of 
origin.266  For this reason, surrogacy is much easier for consular officials to 
detect than cases of intra-uterine insemination using donor sperm, or IVF 
with donor eggs, sperm, or embryos that result in the pregnancy of the 
intending mother abroad but the birth of the child in the home country.267  
                                                          
 260. Wannes Van Hoof & Guido Pennings, Extraterritoriality for Cross-border 
Reproductive Care: Should States Act Against Citizens Travelling Abroad for Illegal 
Infertility Treatment?, 23 REPROD. BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 546 (2011). 
 261. See Bulent Urman & Kayhan Yakin, New Turkish Legislation on Assisted 
Reproductive Techniques and Centres: A Step in the Right Direction?, 21 REPROD. 
BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 729, 730 (2011) (providing that failure to abide by the restriction 
on discussing certain reproductive techniques could result in doctors losing their 
license and facing criminal charges). 
 262. Id. at 730. 
 263. Jenni Millbank, J., The New Surrogacy Parentage Laws in Australia: Cautious 
Regulation or “25 Brick Walls?”, 35 MELB. U. L. REV. 165 (2011); Dennis Chong, 
Police Probe Surrogacy Dad, THE STANDARD (Dec. 2, 2010), 
http://www.thestandard.com.hk/news_detail.asp?pp_cat=30&art_id=105592&sid=3048
9519&con_type=1. 
 264. FAM. CODE (Vidomosti Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy, 2002 No. 21-22, at 135) 
(Ukr.); Nilanjana S. Roy, Protecting the Rights of Surrogate Mothers in India, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 4, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/05/world/asia/05iht-
letter05.html (finding that since commercial surrogacy was legalized in India in 2002, it 
has become key in the country’s booming medical tourism market). 
 265. Id. 
 266. Born in India, Nowhere to Belong, TIMES OF INDIA, Dec. 18, 2009, 
http://www.timesnow.tv/Born-in-India-no-where-to-belong/articleshow/4334611.cms 
[hereinafter Born in India] (relating that because German surrogacy laws did not allow 
the twins to be treated as German citizens, their father brought an action before the 
Gujarat high court, seeking Indian citizenship). 
 267. Esther Farnós Amorós, Inscripción en España de la filiación derivada del 
acceso a la maternidad subrogada en California [Registration of Filiation Resulting 
From Access to Surrogacy in California], 1.10 InDret 7 (2010) (Spain), available at 
http://www.indret.com/pdf/711_es.pdf (describing the development and history of 
alternative reproductive methods). 
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After having children in this fashion and seeking to return home, many of 
these new parents have been refused travel documents for their children by 
their countries’ consular officials upon suspicion of their having engaged in 
surrogacy.268  At home, parents have met with official refusal to recognize 
the parent-child relationship or to bestow citizenship upon the children.269  
Obviously, a government intent on curtailing cross-border surrogacy may 
refuse to issue a passport or visa to the child, may not bestow citizenship 
upon the child, and may refuse to recognize the intended parents as the 
legal parents of the child.270  Problems can also arise in host countries 
where the law does not automatically entitle the intending parents to 
recognition as the legal parents of the child. 
The case of the Yamadas, a Japanese couple who traveled to India to hire 
a gestational surrogate, highlights the problems that can arise in the host 
country.  After the surrogate gave birth to Manji, a baby girl created with 
Mr. Yamada’s sperm and the egg of a third party, the Yamadas divorced.271  
Mr. Yamada and Manji then became “caught between two legal systems” 
when India refused to allow Mr. Yamada, because he was a single father, to 
obtain a passport for Manji or to legally establish his fatherhood by 
                                                          
 268. In re X & Y, [2008] EWHC (Fam.) 3030, [2009] 2 W.L.R. 1274 (Eng.), 
available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2008/3030.html (holding that 
under both English and Ukranian law, the children were made both parentless and 
stateless); Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters], 1 e civ., Dec. 
17, 2008, Bull. civ. II, No. 07-20468, (Fr.), available at  
http://www.courdecassation.fr/jurisprudence_2/premiere_chambre_civile_568/arret_no
_12031.html; KARI POINTS, THE KENAN INST. FOR ETHICS AT DUKE UNIV., 
COMMERCIAL SURROGACY AND FERTILITY TOURISM IN INDIA: THE CASE OF BABY 
MANJI 2-3, 8 (2009), available at 
http://www.duke.edu/web/kenanethics/CaseStudies/BabyManji.pdf (discussing that 
India’s  dominance in reproductive tourism results from its lower costs, the large 
number of women willing the engage in surrogacy, English speaking providers, an 
encouraging climate, and the total absense of government regulation); Farnós Amorós, 
supra note 267, at 5-6 (finding that homosexual couples seeking to conceive a child 
through surrogacy often travel to the United States, specifically California); Born in 
India, supra note 266 (noting the failure under German law, to recognize the legitimacy 
of twins born through surrogacy and preventing them from returning to the country as 
Indian citizens); G.R. Hari, Michigan Couple Lose Their Child to Surrogate Mother, 
WEB-BLOG OF INDIAN SURROGACY LAW CENTRE (Feb. 04, 2010, 4:08 PM), 
http://blog.indiansurrogacylaw.com/page/3/ (holding that since Michigan is one of five 
U.S. states to not recognize surrogacy contracts, the biological mother is considered the 
legal mother); Patrick Wautelet, Belgian Judgment on Surrogate Motherhood, 
CONFLICT OF LAWS.NET (Apr. 27, 2010), http://conflictoflaws.net/2010/belgian-
judgment-on-surrogate-motherhood/ (Belgium) (describing how the authorities in 
Belgium refused to give effect to the birth certificates of twins born through surrogacy). 
 269. See generally Rotman, supra note 1 (noting that in France, surrogacy, “la 
gestation pour autrui (GPA),” is prohibited and that the parentage of children born to 
surregates is not recognized France). 
 270. See Born in India, supra note 268; Farnós Amorós, supra note 268, at 7; 
Wautelet, supra note 268. 
 271. POINTS, supra note 263, at 1 (reporting that even though the couple divorced in 
2008, a month before Baby Manji was born, UIkufami still wanted to raise the child 
without his ex-wife). 
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adopting her.272  Appeals to Japan, which does not explicitly ban surrogacy 
but where the law provides that the gestational mother is the legal mother 
of a child, were unavailing.273  Finally, after an Indian court ordered the 
government to act expeditiously on Mr. Yamada’s request for permission to 
take Manji to Japan, the Indian government issued a transit document, 
Japan having issued a one-year visa to Manji on humanitarian grounds.274   
Several cases illustrate what can go wrong when the law of the home 
country bans surrogacy and intending parents nonetheless pursue it abroad.  
Surrogacy has been banned in France since 1991.275  When couples travel 
abroad to engage a surrogate and return home with a child, their birth 
certificates are considered falsified and are not recognized by the French 
government.  Only the biological connection between the male partner and 
the child is recognized.276  In the case of the Mennessons, consular officials 
in Los Angeles, suspicious that the couple had employed a gestational 
surrogate in contravention of French law, refused to issue a passport or a 
visa for the children.277  After the children travelled on United States 
passports back to France with their parents, French prosecutors attempted 
to charge the French couple with fraud and also attempted to set aside their 
entry in the official register of parentage, thereby depriving the children of 
French citizenship.278  A judge determined that France had no 
extraterritorial jurisdiction in the case, since commercial surrogacy is legal 
in the United States.279  On the citizenship and parentage questions, 
although the court recognized the Mennessons’ parentage, it refused to 
grant the girls the French citizenship that would normally flow from this 
recognition.  Adoption is not a solution, since under French law, those who 
have resorted to international surrogacy are not allowed to adopt because 
they have attempted to circumvent legal adoption procedures.280  The 
                                                          
 272. Id. at 6. 
 273. Id. at 5 (citing the Japanese Civil Code which recognized the mother only as 
the woman who gave birth to the baby). 
 274. Id. at 6-7 (noting that the first identity certificate issued by the Indian 
government to a surrogate child born in India was issued to Baby Manji). 
 275. J. Bo, La législation sera débattue au Parlement français en 2009 [Legislation 
Will Be Debated in the French Parliament in 2009], LE MONDE, Aug. 5, 2008, at 3 
(Fr.). 
 276. Id. 
 277. SYLVIE MENNESSON & DOMINIQUE MENNESSON, INTERDITS D’ENFANTS: LE 
TEMOIGNAGE UNIQUE DE PARENTS AYANT RECOURS A UNE MERE PORTEUSE [DENIED 
CHILDREN: THE STORY OF PARENTS WHO USED A SURROGATE] 90, 86-92, 109 (2008) 
[hereinafter INTERDITS D’ENFANTS]. 
 278. Id. at 143.   
 279. Gilles Cuniberti, Flying to California to Bypass the French Ban on Surrogacy, 
CONFLICT OF LAWS .NET, (Nov. 5, 2007), http://conflictoflaws.net/2007/flying-to-
california-to-bypass-the-french-ban-on-surrogacy/. 
 280. Myriam Hunter-Henin, Surrogacy: Is There Room for a New Liberty Between 
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public minister had alluded to being favorably disposed to the petition,281 
but finally, after five court decisions in the course of ten years, the Cour de 
Cassation ruled that the girls were not French citizens.282  An editorial in Le 
Monde cried: 
How do you justify depriving these children, now strangers in their 
parents’ country, of all the rights connected with citizenship, based 
solely on the way they were conceived and when there is no dispute over 
their parentage?  What are they guilty of, besides their birth, to merit 
such sanctions?283 
The Mennessons now plan to take their case to the European Court of 
Human Rights284 where they may rely on cases forbidding disparate 
treatment of nonmarital children.  In the meantime, hundreds of children 
currently live in France without French citizenship, since their gestational 
surrogates were not French.285  This may mean that once they reach the age 
of majority, they will not be allowed to remain in France.286 
Cases in Spain and Belgium involve gay male couples.  The Belgian 
couple was involved in two years of legal wrangling related to the birth of 
their son to a gestational carrier in Ukraine.287  The child was left stranded 
in Ukraine during this period.288  Belgium finally issued a passport to the 
                                                          
the French Prohibitive Position and the English Ambivalence?, in LAW AND BIOETHICS 
329, 336-37 (Michael Freeman ed., 2008). 
 281. Najat Vallaud Belkacem, Gestation pour autrui: une question de responsabilité 
morale [Surrogacy: A Question of Moral Responsibility], LE MONDE, Apr. 7, 2011, 
(Fr.), http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2011/04/07/gestation-pour-autrui-une-
question-de-responsibilite-morale_1504228_3232.html (“Even the public minister 
declared himself in favor of this recognition on behalf of the interest of the child and 
his or her right to a normal family life . . . .”). 
 282. Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters], 1 e civ., Apr. 6, 
2011, Bull. civ. II, No. 10-19.053, (Fr.), available at 
http://www.courdecassation.fr/jurisprudence_2/premiere_chambre_civil_568. 
 283. Belkacem, supra note 281. 
       284.  Le Monde, Gestation pour autrui: “Nos filles resteront toujours des fantômes 
au regard du droit français,” LE MONDE, Apr. 6, 2011 (Fr.), 
http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2011/04/06/gestation-pour-autrui-nos-filles-
resteront-toujours-des-fantomes-au-regard-du-droit-francais_1503967_3224.html.  
285.  Michael Cook, Children of surrogate mothers are not French, court rules, 
BIOEDGE, Apr. 9, 2011, 
http://www.bioedge.org/index.php/bioethics/bioethics_article/9480. 
         286.  See Le Monde, supra note 284 (“When they become adults, they will have none 
of the rights of residency, work and the vote that French and European citizens have.”).  
 287. Mères porteuses: Mahous demande un debat parlementaire au plus vite 
[Surrogates: Mahous Requests a Parliamentary Debate as Soon as Possible], LA 
DERNIÈRE HEURE (Mar. 1, 2011) (Belg.), 
http://www.dhnet.be/infos/societe/article/344953/meres-porteuses-mahoux-demande-
un-debat-parlementaire-au-plus-vite.html. 
 288. Un couple gay récupère son fils adoptif bloqué en Ukraine [A Gay Couple 
Collects Their Adoptive Child Held in Ukraine], LA DERNIÈRE HEURE (Feb. 26, 2011) 
(Belg.), http://www.dhnet.be/infos/belgique/article/344546/un-couple-gay-recupere-
son-fils-adoptif-bloque-en-ukraine.html (discussing that because the father was unable 
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young child and now recognizes a parental link between him and his 
biological father.289  In a Spanish case, consular officials in Los Angeles 
refused to recognize the parentage of two male Spanish nationals, married 
in Spain, who travelled to California to have children with the help of a 
surrogate mother.290  Twins were born, and the official birth certificates, in 
conformity with a pre-birth judgment issued by a California court, listed 
both men as parents with no reference to the genetic or gestational 
parentage of the twins.  They sought the assistance of Spanish consular 
officials for the purpose of registering their parentage of the twins in the 
Spanish civil registry.  The consulate refused to issue visas, basing its 
decision on the Spanish law prohibiting surrogacy in Spain.291  Upon 
returning to Spain, the couple met with resistance when they sought official 
recognition of the California birth certificates.  A court hearing the matter 
declared that it was a violation of Spanish law not to include the gestational 
mother as a parent in the registry because the primary and most important 
fact for this purpose was who gave birth.292  The Ministry of Justice 
intervened to establish guidelines for the entry into the civil registry of 
children born to surrogate mothers abroad.  The Ministry found it necessary 
to balance the interests of the children with the interests of the Spanish 
government in prohibiting surrogacy.  This balance could be achieved, it 
concluded, by obtaining a judgment in a host country court recognizing the 
legal validity of the birth certificate and making factual findings to the 
effect that the contract for surrogacy was entered into without fraud, 
overreaching or exploitation of the surrogate mother.293 
The Spanish Ministry of Justice’s instruction embraces the legal doctrine 
of comity as the best solution to the family recognition problems that can 
arise from international commercial surrogacy.  The doctrine of comity 
speaks to whether a country should defer to the judgments and public acts 
                                                          
to pay for the child’s pension with the host family and was unable to smuggle the child 
into Poland, the child was placed in an orphanage in the Ukraine). 
 289. Mères porteuses, supra note 287 (relating that the Belgian couple spent some € 
90,000 before the Belgian Government had issued a passport to the child); Un couple 
gay, supra note 288. 
 290. Farnós Amorós, supra note 267, at 4. 
 291. Id. 
 292. Marta Requejo, Surrogate Motherhood and the Spanish Homosexual Couple, 
CONFLICT OF LAWS.NET (Sept. 20, 2010), http://conflictoflaws.net/2010/surrogate-
motherhood-and-spanish-homosexual-couple-iii/ (“Spanish law expressly prohibits the 
parentage in these cases except for registered for the person who has given birth.”) 
(translated by author). 
 293. Emilio De Benito, Justicia abre la puerta a la inscripción de los hijos de 
“vientre de alquiler”, [Justice Opens the Way to Register the Children of Surrogacy], 




Storrow: The Phantom Children of the Republic: International Surrogacy and
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2012
  
602 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 20:3 
of another country.294  Final judgments of courts of foreign nations, which 
concern the recovery of sums of money, the status of a person, or determine 
interests in property, are conclusive and entitled to recognition in the courts 
of other nations.295  The judgment must have been rendered under a judicial 
system providing impartial tribunals and procedures compatible with due 
process of law, and the issuing court must have had jurisdiction over the 
defendant and jurisdiction over the subject matter.296  A court may refuse 
comity if the foreign judgment in question was obtained by fraud or if 
extending comity would undermine a strong public policy.297 
Denying children citizenship and legal recognition of the parentage of 
the individuals who have travelled abroad to have these children with the 
intent of raising them seems a particularly draconian and disproportionate 
response to the problems a country fears may arise from the violation of its 
surrogacy proscriptions abroad.  The response does not appear to be well 
geared to discouraging international surrogacy, nor does it entail any 
mechanism by which a nation might express more than a mere symbolic 
concern for the welfare of children and surrogate mothers. 
By contrast, the doctrine of comity seems well designed to afford states 
some latitude in evaluating whether the transaction abroad has proceeded in 
a fashion that does not give rise to anxiety about overreaching, exploitation 
and abuse.298  The recent instruction of the Spanish Ministry of Justice 
acknowledges the shortcomings of using the denial of citizenship and 
parentage recognition as blunt instruments in a battle against international 
surrogacy.  In adopting a measured, middle-of-the-road approach, one that 
embraces the time-honored international norm of comity, the Ministry has 
placed the burden equally on the shoulders of the state and of the 
commissioning parents to ensure that, above all, the transaction not have 
exploited conditions of poverty in the destination country and not have 
resulted in parentage determinations that would be anathema to the welfare 
of the child. 
The Mennesson case and others like it have opened the door to the 
possibility of legislative reform in France.  Rumblings in the French 
Parliament indicate a certain level of discomfort among some Socialist 
                                                          
 294. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 101 cmt. e (1987) (defining comity “as the recognition which one nation 
allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, 
having due regard both to international duty and convenience and to the rights of its 
own citizens or of other persons who are under the protections of its laws”). 
 295. Id. § 481(1) (declaring that final judgments of a foreign state are entitled to 
recognition in courts in the United States).  
 296.  Id. § 481 cmt. f (enforcing decisions of foreign tribunals when the fairness and 
reliability of the proceeding were previously established).  
 297. Id. 
 298. Id. § 101 cmt. e. 
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Party members who believe “the prohibition on surrogacy doesn’t need to 
result in children who suffer legal instability.” 299  Their proposal was to 
legalize surrogacy so that the offspring would not be deprived of a legal 
mother.300  Only heterosexual couples could have recourse to surrogacy, no 
compensation would be allowed, and it would have to be approved in 
advance by governmental officials.301  But others feel that relaxing the 
strict stance against granting citizenship to children created through 
international surrogacy would unjustly elevate the right to procreate above 
the need to safeguard the rights of women and the welfare of children.302  
The right of women to control their own bodies, it is said, does not go as 
far as undertaking to become pregnant for another.303  The risks of 
commercialization and harm to children, including the surrogate’s own 
children, are simply too great.304  The ongoing debate is so heated that 
France is probably a long way from reforming its surrogacy laws; questions 
arising from it will most likely remain with the courts for the time being.305  
In the meantime, the problem of how to treat the children born of surrogacy 
continues to vex commentators, with some suggesting that there should be 
no barrier to recognizing the paternity of the biological father while 
arranging for a sharing of parental authority by his wife or partner.306  In 
Belgium, too, there have been calls for legislation in response to the gay 
couple who had so many problems in Ukraine.307  The current proposal is 
to employ adoption procedures to finalize the transfer of parental rights 
from the surrogate mother to the intending parents, with the proviso that at 
least one member of the commissioning couple have a biological link to the 
child.308  Others believe surrogacy should be banned altogether with strict 
exceptions for “physiological impossibility.”309 
                                                          
 299. Charlotte Rotman, Projecteur sur les bébés fantômes [Spotlight on “Ghost 
Babies”], LA LIBÉRATION (Feb. 10, 2011) (Fr.), 
http://www.liberation.fr/societe/01012319068-projecteur-sur-les-bebes-fantomes. 
 300. Bo, supra note 275, at 3. 
 301. Id. 
 302. Philippe Bas & Luc Derepas, Une atteinte intolérable à la dignité des femmes 
[An Intolerable Affront to the Dignity of Women], LE MONDE, at 15 (May 23, 2009) 
(Fr.). 
 303. Id. at 15. 
 304. Id. 
 305. Belkacem, supra note 281. 
 306. Bas & Derepas, supra note 302, at 15. 
 307. Mères porteuses, supra note 287. 
 308. Id. (remarking about how several bills are pending in the Supreme Assembly to 
set out a gender prohibition of any surrogacy agreement). 
   309.   Id. (“When the risk is too great for the mother or infant during pregnancy, or 
where there is a physiological impossibility for the mother to become pregnant, the use 
of surrogate motherhood is justified.”) (translated by author). 
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There is a powerful flavor of the new illegitimacy in restrictions on 
assisted reproduction with donor gametes or surrogate gestation in Europe.  
When pressed on the policy behind these restrictions, states say they have 
to do with efforts to prevent “unusual” family relationships from forming.  
Austria recently defended its restrictions in the European Court of Human 
Rights by stating it wanted to prevent two-mother families and situations in 
which a child might be the object of a battle between gestational, genetic, 
and/or social mothers.  A French parliamentary commission, too, has issued 
a report describing how children are harmed when they have a biological 
link to only one of their parents.310  Unlike the old illegitimacy, these 
restrictions on paths to parenthood have little to do with marriage and much 
to do with a vision of motherhood that is impossible to harmonize with the 
families people create through surrogacy.   But rendering these families 
“illegitimate” has done little to deter their formation, as the uptick in the 
incidence of reproductive tourism makes all too evident.  Recognizing this, 
the Hague Conference on Private International Law is studying the 
possibility for some form of broader response to the problems arising in the 
context of international surrogacy.311  Despite the likelihood of vast 
differences of opinion on the matter, it seems certain that some form of 
administrative cooperation will be required to prevent adverse 
discrimination against children “on the basis of birth or parental status.”312  
In the meantime, there will be important work for lawyers to ensure that  
children are not deprived of a legal connection to their parents and their 
countries simply because they were born to couples and individuals so 
committed to becoming parents and raising children that they defied unjust 
laws. 
IV.  LEGAL PRACTICE IMPLICATIONS 
Refusing to recognize the rearing parents of children born of surrogacy 
and denying these children citizenship constitute serious legal interference 
with international surrogacy.  In contrast to laws that restrict access to 
certain forms of assisted reproduction, the policy of which is to interfere 
with a reproductive project before it commences either in the home country 
or in a foreign country, the impact of this form of legal interference occurs 
                                                          
310.  ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE, RAPPORT FAIT AU NOM DE LA MISSION D'INFORMATION 
SUR LA FAMILLE ET LES DROITS DES ENFANTS (2006), available at 
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/12/pdf/rap-info/i2832.pdf 
311. HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW ISSUES SURROUNDING THE STATUS OF CHILDREN, INCLUDING 
ISSUES ARISING FROM INTERNATIONAL SURROGACY ARRANGMENTS (2011), available at 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/genaff2011pd11e.pdf. 
312.  Id. at ¶¶ 51-53. 
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after the child is already born.313  Legal interference at this final stage of the 
continuum of assisted reproductive care is arguably the most fraught for the 
intending parents because they have come so close to realizing their goal of 
becoming a parent.  This distinction has led surrogacy attorney Steven 
Snyder to remark: 
Because of the parentage issues in establishing the legal parentage of the 
resulting children, the legal issues become paramount and almost 
primary to the medical issues.  Obviously, historically the people that are 
typically the parents are the woman who gives birth and her husband and 
when you do a surrogacy you totally shift the legal intended parentage to 
the genetic parents, neither of whom has anything to do with the 
gestation; therefore, the law becomes more important than the 
medicine.314   
The importance of providing complete, clear, and accurate legal advice 
to these families in formation will fall to lawyers.  United States attorneys 
specializing in advising such clients can expect to meet with foreign 
intentional parents arriving in the United States for surrogacy as well as 
intentional parents from the United States going abroad.  Both types of 
clients might best be served by coordinating with counsel in the foreign 
jurisdiction, whether it be the home or destination country. 
One issue that will be of great interest to clients is what standard of care 
they are owed by the professionals who undertake to assist them.  
Malpractice liability results from the breach of a professional standard of 
care and resulting damages to a patient or client.  Malpractice is 
complicated in the cross-border context owing to the different standards of 
care that exist in different jurisdictions.  Indeed, scholars of medical 
tourism have expressed concern that patients who travel abroad for medical 
procedures may have little legal recourse against malpractice in 
jurisdictions that defer heavily to physicians in determining the standard of 
care.315  Moreover, there may be legal and practical barriers to bringing suit 
against a foreign physician or clinic in a patient’s home country.316  Finally, 
                                                          
 313. It is doubtful that the legal approach here has the policy of preventing cross-
border travel.  Most instances involve consular officials who simply do not know how 
to proceed.  In the Spanish case, we have a legal determination that the consular 
officials were correct in denying the request to enter the couple as parents in the civil 
registry. 
 314. Fertility Myths Answered, HEALTHRADIO.NET (Feb. 09, 2010), available at 
http://www.healthradio.net/component/mtree/Health-Radio-Shows/Ask-Dr-2E-
DeSilva/Fertility-Myths-Answered-41605/details. 
 315. Nathan G. Cortez, Patients Without Borders: The Emerging Global Market for 
Patients and the Evolution of Modern Health Care, 83 IND. L. REV. 71, 73 (2008) 
(claiming that by opting out of the medical systems within the United States, couples 
are also opting out of the country’s systems for licensing, accreditation, malpractice, 
and regulatory approval of medical technologies). 
 316. See generally I. Glenn Cohen, Protecting Patients with Passports: Medical 
Tourism and the Patient-Protective Argument, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1467 (2010). 
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litigation by foreigners in the country where the service was delivered can 
be notoriously difficult and expensive.  Even if a judgment can be obtained, 
it can be difficult to enforce from a foreign location. 317 
The professional malpractice of attorneys may also play a role in cross-
border reproductive care.  For example, a patient may contact an attorney 
for advice about the possible legal complications of engaging in 
international commercial surrogacy.  If the agreement between the attorney 
and the client encompasses counseling on the possible legal ramifications 
of pursuing international commercial surrogacy, the attorney risks liability 
if she provides erroneous information that causes the client to suffer injury. 
Intentional parents who proceed with brokers may encounter other perils.  
Cross-border reproductive travel is an industry that is becoming crowded 
with brokers, and those who engage in deceptive trade practices may lead 
clients to harm but be insulated from legal redress.318  Unlike physicians 
and attorneys, who are regulated, licensed and have special fiduciary 
obligations to their patients and clients, a broker normally operates free of 
regulation and has no obligation to eschew conflicts of interest that would 
impede her from zealously promoting the interests of the patient.  Indeed, a 
broker’s clients may actually be the clinics that have hired her to locate 
patients.  In pursuing her trade, a broker may be tempted to make 
misrepresentations about the services or level of care the patient can expect 
from the foreign clinic.319  Under the law, if the patient is thereafter harmed 
by the clinic, the broker may not be liable if she, as is typical, has signed a 
contract with the patient that absolves her from liability.  It is of the utmost 
importance that patients understand that brokers, who provide a valuable 
service and may have the very best of intentions, are not necessarily 
advocates for patients but may be interested above all in steering patients to 
overseas clinics with which they have exclusive agreements.320 
Judges hearing international surrogacy cases have recognized that lack of 
good legal advice is no deterrent to proceeding with international 
surrogacy.  In In re X & Y, a couple had received legal advice about their 
                                                          
 317. Id. at 1503-04 (noting foreign courts’ reluctance to enforce U.S. court decisions 
because of their objections to U.S. jurisdictional grounds and punitive damage awards). 
 318. Cohen, supra note 316, at 1495 (finding that foreign hospitals and providers are 
very rarely satisfy the personal jurisdiction requirement as these groups rarely have the 
systematic and continuous contacts with the plaintiff’s home state to establish general 
jurisdiction). 
 319. Nathan G. Cortez, Recalibrating the Legal Risks of Cross-Border Health Care, 
10 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1, 15-16 (2010) (commenting that while 
patients may sue medical tourism facilitators for failure to obtain informed consent, but 
it is difficult for U.S. courts to ascertain whether the statements by the facilitators are 
misrepresentations). 
 320. Amy Speier, Brokers, Consumers and the Internet: How North American 
Consumers Navigate Their Infertility Journeys, 23 REPROD. BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 592 
(2011). 
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plan to pursue surrogacy in Ukraine.321  The couple was unfortunately 
uninformed about the difficulty they would have bringing the child back 
into the country because they would not have the requisite parental order 
from an English court.322  This was not an isolated case; the same difficulty 
occurred a second time in the case of In re L.323  To be able to receive a 
parenting order in an international surrogacy case, the commissioning 
individuals must show that (1) the sum paid was not disproportionate to 
reasonable expenses; (2) they were acting in good faith without moral taint 
in their dealings with the surrogate; and (3) they did not attempt to defraud 
the authorities.324 
Justice Hedley, who presided over both X & Y and L., found that the sum 
paid in X & Y was not disproportionate, recognizing that the sum paid 
could vary depending on the place of the arrangement.325  The sum paid in 
urban California, for example, might grossly outstrip the sum paid in rural 
India but would nonetheless be in line with reasonable expenses.  In 
contrast, in In re L., Hedley was convinced that the sum paid was clearly in 
excess of reasonable expenses.326  Nonetheless, Hedley could not disregard 
the best interests of the child in a parenting order in these cases.  He 
remarked: 
It’s probably always in a child’s interests to have a legal relationship 
with the parents who are raising her.  The difficulty is that it is almost 
impossible to imagine a set of circumstances in which by the time the 
case comes to court, the welfare of any child would not be gravely 
compromised by a refusal to make an order.327 
Even in In re L., Hedley felt the best interests of the child must control, 
“[I]t will only be in the clearest case of the abuse of public policy that the 
court will be able to withhold an order . . . .”328  The most lamentable factor 
                                                          
 321. In re X & Y, [2008] EWHC (Fam.) 3030, [2009] 2 W.L.R. 1274 (Eng.), 
available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2008/3030.html (explaining 
that the couple entered into a surrogacy agreement which ensured that the payments to 
the surrogate were lawful under both Ukrainian and English law). 
 322. On the substantive law and procedure for parental orders, see DEWINDER BIRK, 
HUMAN FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY: THE NEW LAW 141-43 (2009). 
 323. In re L, [2010] EWHC (Fam.) 3146 (Eng.), available at 
http://www.nataliegambleassociates.com/assets/assets/RE%20L%20a%20minor%20%
282010%29.pdf (recognizing that even careful and conscientious parents are still 
receiving incorrect information). 
 324. Millbank, supra note 263, at 199 (referring to In re X & Y). 
 325. Id. (determining that the payment was not excessive when referencing the 
comparable cost of living in urban Ukraine and the United Kingdom). 
 326. In re L, [2010] EWHC (Fam.) 3146 (recognizing that even careful and 
conscientious parents are still receiving incorrect information). 
 327. In re X & Y, [2008]  EWHC (Fam.) 3030, [2009] 2 W.L.R. 1274 (Eng.), 
available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2008/3030.html. 
 328. In re L., [2010] EWHC (Fam.) (recognizing that even careful and conscientious 
parents are still receiving incorrect information). 
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of these cases, opined the court, was the fact the most careful and 
conscientious parents had received erroneous legal advice about what 
would be required to create their family through international surrogacy.   
Counseling may not be the only important role for lawyers to assume in 
this context.  Margaret Brazier, a law professor and advocate for 
harmonization of the status of children born as a result of assisted 
conception, has opined that status rules for children born outside their 
parents’ country of origin are necessary.329  This may be one area where 
“there are good reasons for achieving a consensus at a European or global 
level.”330  The Hague Conference has already begun a conversation that 
will advance this important work.  It is critical that any law reform efforts 
that lawyers choose to undertake forcefully articulate that rendering 
surrogate children “illegitimate” harms them and furthers no proper public 
purpose.  Bestowing a subordinate status on any child born of surrogacyis 
every bit as invidious as was the stigma of “illegitimacy” that historically 
attached to children born to families that did not fit the mold of one 
biological mother married to one biological father.331  The work of lawyers 
advocating for changes in the law will be every bit as crucial as their 
careful advisement of couples and individuals considering building their 
families through surrogacy.    
CONCLUSION 
Throughout history, the doctrine of illegitimacy has been used to heap 
opprobrium and disparate treatment upon the heads of both children born to 
an unmarried couple and the couple themselves.  But there is far less 
stigma and legal disadvantage associated with “illegitimacy” of birth today 
than in previous generations.  Nonetheless, new ideas about what makes 
children and their families illegitimate have begun to emerge in response to 
new reproductive technologies.  Since assisted reproductive techniques do 
not involve illicit sexual intercourse and are often employed by married 
couples seeking to have children, it would seem at first blush as if they 
would not be linked with adultery and illegitimacy.  Alternative 
insemination was, however, associated with adultery and illegitimacy from 
a very early stage, and, more recently, countries have begun to classify 
families created through international surrogacy as unworthy of civil status. 
                                                          
 329. HOUSE OF COMMONS, SELECT COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY, 5TH 
REPORT para. 382 (2007), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/ 
pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmsctech/7/710.htm. 
 330. Id. 
 331. Id. (finding that nationality has significant implications for basic human rights, 
and therefore, judicial systems must recognize that role performance patterns have 
changed and differentiating children because of their maternity or paternity should not 
account for the granting of nationality). 
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Perhaps it is not surprising that old notions about who belongs and who 
does not have reemerged in response to new ways of procreating.  These 
unfamiliar technologies seem to threaten settled methods of forming our 
most important and lasting bonds, the strength of which for millennia have 
been thought to depend on genetic and gestational connections.  To the 
extent societies are unwilling to accept that similarly powerful bonds can 
arise from intention to parent and functioning as a parent, and to the extent 
it appears to governments that the very fabric of society can be undermined 
by recognizing such bonds, they are acting on similarly powerful notions.  
A response in proportion to the severe level of opprobrium that children 
born out of wedlock faced in prior generations is to be expected.  This 
“new illegitimacy,” then, is simply the old illegitimacy in new clothing. 
Governments, though, must justify their actions with good reasons.  
Hundreds travel each year from countries where surrogacy is illegal to 
countries where it is not.  Upon their return, these families face 
prosecution, refusal of recognition and denial of citizenship.  To date,  
governments have justified their actions by expressing worry about the 
plight of gestational surrogates and the harm that will accrue to children 
born of surrogacy.  The biblical surrogacy-by-enslavement story of 
Abraham, Sarah, and Hagar bears little resemblance to contemporary 
surrogacy arrangements, however.  Although some believe the exploitation 
of women happens in every case of surrogacy, the abstract reasoning this 
notion relies on unravels when individual cases of surrogacy are examined.  
Without good evidence that the feared harms are present in the majority of 
cases, it seems more than reckless for governments to proceed by 
presumption to refuse to allow the children born to their citizens through 
surrogacy to participate as full citizens.  Fortunately, courts in some 
countries have already begun to recognize that child welfare is very hard to 
promote when they are relegated to a lesser status than they would enjoy 
had they been born through “legitimate” channels. 
Perhaps most important of all is the reality that, given the importance of 
reproduction and families to human life, international commercial 
surrogacy will continue, no matter what bulwarks governments try to erect 
against the rising tide.  This dynamic will create a most important 
obligation for lawyers to protect their clients against misinformation, the 
overreaching of brokers, and the malpractice of physicians.  Those who 
desire that international surrogacy be used only for the good can expect to 
contribute no less. 
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